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Introduction
Among the polities in the Middle East and North Africa during the nineteenth
century, the Khedivate of Egypt and the Husaynid Beylik of Tunis shared similar aspects
in dealing with the matter of slavery. Certainly, all polities in the Middle East and North
Africa in the nineteenth century faced the same external pressure to abolish slavery and
the slave trade. This pressure came from the British Empire, the prime mover of
abolitionism in the nineteenth century. From the early nineteenth century, the British took
the lead in the abolition of the slave trade and slavery. Britain abolished the slave trade
inside the British Empire in 1807, and slavery in 1833. Then, it started to impose
diplomatic pressure on other countries to follow the lead of it. After European and Latin
American Countries, the polities in the Middle East and North Africa also encountered the
same sort of pressure.
Egypt and Tunisia were no exception. From 1837, the Khedivate of Egypt began
to face British insistence that the raids to capture slaves have to be ceased. 1 From the
1860s, British involvement intensified. As for the Husaynid Beylik of Tunis, the British also
attempted to stop the slave trade across Tunisia from the 1830s and the Miltiades affair
of 1841 brought increased intervention.2
Foreign intervention was not the only motive for the rulers of Egypt and Tunisia to
implement the restriction or abolition of the slave trade. Internal causes also played a part.

1

Reda Mowafi, Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempts in Egypt and the Sudan 1820 1882 (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1981), 45.
2
The Miltiades was a Greek ship transporting black slaves from Tunis to Istanbul. It was detained by
Greek port authorities in 1841. See Ismael M. Montana, “The Ordeals of Slaves' Flight in Tunisia,” in
African Voices on Slavery and the Slave Trade: Volume 1: The Sources, ed. Alice Bellagamba, Sandra E.
Greene, and Martin A. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 241.
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While other polities, including the Ottoman central government, also regarded the
restriction on slavery as a part of their projects for change,3 Egypt and Tunisia had more
specific reasons to restrict the practices of slavery and these internal causes were another
common feature.
In case of the Khedivate of Egypt, while Saʿid (r. 1854-1863) tried to prohibit the
slave trade in part because of his European culture and liberal education, 4 Ismaʿil (r.
1863-1879) justified expansion into Africa by asserting the need to suppress the slave
trade. European figures including Speke and Saunders widely supported this argument. 5
He also attempted to get financial support from the European powers by emphasizing his
engagement in anti-slavery actions. Ahmad Bey of Tunisia (r. 1837-1855) also sought
Britain’s support to stave off a French takeover in Tunis by abolishing the slave trade.6
Egypt and Tunisia in the nineteenth century also had a similar political status.
Although both of them were under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, they
enjoyed political autonomy to a large extent. Therefore, they made their own decisions
through autonomous administrative systems while being influenced by the suzerain. This
combination was not common in other fully independent neighbors or less autonomous
and reconquered provinces of the empire. Except non-Muslim principalities in the Balkans
patronized by Russia, the Khedivate of Egypt and the Beylik of Tunis were the only
privileged provinces recognized by the Ottoman Empire; Ottoman provincial laws did not
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Ehud R. Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, 1840-1890 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press. 1982), 108.
4
Muhammad Fuʾad Shukri, The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan (1863-1879) (Cairo: Librairie la
Renaissance d'Egypte, 1937), 110; P. M. Holt and M. W. Daly, The History of the Sudan: From the
Coming of Islam to the Present Day, 3rd ed. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979), 71.
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Mowafi, Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempts, 61.
6
Ismael M. Montana, The Abolition of Slavery in Ottoman Tunisia (Gainesville, Florida: University Press
of Florida, 2013), 135.
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apply to them. 7 Both of them were autonomous political units sharing a common politicoreligious heritage with the Ottoman Empire. 8
However, the similar internal and external circumstances did not lead to the same
process. Saʿid and Ismaʿil took many measures against slavery and the slave trade.
However, their orders or decrees lacked detailed plans before the ultimate termination of
the slave trade was announced in 1877, as a result of the Anglo-Egyptian convention.
That convention was arranged only two years before the abdication of Ismaʿil and the
convention did not specify the full abolition of slavery itself. As for the anti-slavery process
of the Tunisian Beylik, Ahmad prohibited the slave trade in 1841 and abolished slavery
itself in 1846. He gradually took measures against slavery until the final abolition of 1846
at a quite rapid pace. The immediate and complete liberation of all slaves in 1846 was
not attempted in the Khedivate of Egypt before it became a protectorate of the British
Empire although Saʿid once issued a decree that superficially permitted freedom to all the
slaves who want to leave the service of their masters of their own accord. 9
Previous studies on slavery and anti-slavery in the MENA region gave details
about the circumstances and conditions related to anti-slavery in each country, but
comparative explanations regarding the differences between countries have been lacking.
In this thesis, I will compare Egypt and Tunisia, two major states involved with anti-slavery
in the region during the nineteenth century, in order to examine the reasons for the
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Fujinami Nobuyoshi, "Between Sovereignty and Suzerainty: History of the Ottoman Privileged
Provinces,” in A World History of Suzerainty: A Modern History of East and West Asia and Translated
Concepts, ed. Okamoto Takashi (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2019), 56.
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differences between them. Although these two polities had many similar characteristics
in their reform projects, their anti-slavery programs have scarcely been compared with
each other, although they are often mentioned together. 10 A comparison of the antislavery policies in two states that otherwise have multiple similar conditions will suggest
the reasons for different paces and procedures of state-led anti-slavery efforts that can
be applied to other polities. In addition, this comparison may reveal to some extent how
a state project during this period could be influenced by other state projects, their specific
characteristics, and the interest groups related to those projects. Thus, the comparison
may help us explain developments in other institutions of the region during the nineteenth
century.
Therefore, the main objective of this research is to examine the factors accounting
for the differences in practical measures taken against slavery and the slave trade in
Egypt and Tunisia during the nineteenth century despite similar motivations and
conditions. For this purpose, the anti-slavery projects of Khedive Ismaʿil will be compared
mainly to those of Ahmad Bey because of similarities in the situations, motivations, and
final outcomes. Other Egyptian rulers will be discussed to explain the background of the
anti-slavery programs in Egypt. I will not be discussing economic or social changes such
as population growth and the emergence of unregulated labor markets as these changes
occurred long after Isma’il and Ahmad declared their support for abolitionism. As these
rulers took measures against the slave trade and slavery although it was an entrenched
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For example, Toledano briefly mentions the Tunisian anti-slavery measures in a few lines while the
Egyptian anti-slavery process is explained in the Ottoman context by two chapters in his book The
Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, 1840-1890. As for the similar aspects shared by two polities in
their reforms, Brown appropriately presented them in his introduction in Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, The Surest
Path: The Political Treatise of a Nineteenth-Century Muslim Statesman, trans. L. Carl Brown (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). See Ibid., 7.
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custom of the society, we can conclude that, for them, the imperative of reform
outweighed social acceptance of slavery.
The different paces and procedures of anti-slavery programs in Egypt and Tunisia
seem related to the practical circumstances of the slave trade. For example, the scale of
the slave trade might be one cause that influenced the differences. It is evident that the
scale of Tunisia’s slave trade was smaller than that of Egypt. When the size of a specific
trade is smaller, the revenue from it is lower, and therefore it is easier to renounce this
trade. In addition, even if the government is not much concerned about the revenue,
different sizes of the trade may result in different trade networks and dissimilar interest
groups. In chapter one, the different trade volumes and their influence on the slave trade
as an important business will be discussed.
The presence of organized and influential slave traders was another important
reason for the aforementioned differences. The Sudan under the rule of the Egyptian
Khedivate was geographically wide and the slave merchants in that territory secured a
huge amount of money while maintaining private troops. Some of them including the
famous al-Zubayr Rahma al-Mansur (d. 1913) even became merchant-warlords who took
de facto control of specific regions in the Sudan. Along with the deeply-rooted custom of
slavery in the Sudan, the presence of these local powers was an impediment to abolition.
In the Tunisian Beylik, slave traders never acquired the influence that the merchants in
the Sudan had. The geographical area that had to be covered by the anti-slavery plans
of the Beylik of Tunis was also not so wide. The influential traders in the Sudan may have
slowed or obstructed the enforcement of Khedival anti-slavery projects although
ultimately they did not pose a decisive deterrent to the will of the Khedival government
6

when Ismaʿil combined his expansionist projects with the anti-slavery policy. In chapter
two, the different characteristics of these slavers and their influence on the pace of the
anti-slavery polices will be the main subject.
The third factor that controlled the pace of anti-slavery projects was the difference
in government demand for slaves. The Khedivate of Egypt continuously required
Sudanese soldiers. Although Egyptian peasants constituted a major part of the Khedival
army, Sudanese soldiers also had been an important part of the army throughout the
nineteenth century since the time of Muhammad ʿAli (r. 1805-1848). They were needed
to maintain order in the annexed territories in Africa. In addition, Ismaʿil pursued
expansionism and therefore needed many soldiers. These Sudanese soldiers were
recruited through slavery in most cases. Even Saʿid, who tried to restrict slavery by
issuing multiple orders to that effect, caused a great demand for imported slaves to form
his bodyguard staffed by them. As for Ismaʿil, while acknowledging that continuous slave
raids harmed his public relations campaign with Europe, he ended large-scale
government-sponsored raids, yet still paid dealers to acquire slaves and recruited new
soldiers from them even in 1876.11 A tax in slaves imposed upon Sudanese subjects also
continued into the 1870s and no form of official manumission for slave soldiers can be
found.12
Therefore, it can be stated that Ismaʿil depended on slavery to maintain his military
and continue his expansionist policy. The reasons for which the slave trade was finally
prohibited in 1877 may be understood in this context as well. It was one year after the

John P. Dunn, Khedive Ismail’s Army (London: Routledge, 2005), 33.
Douglas H. Johnson, "Sudanese Military Slavery from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century," in
Slavery and Other Forms of Unfree Labour, ed. Léonie J. Archer (London: Routledge, 1988), 146, 148.
11
12
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Battle of Gura in 1876, which ended the Egyptian-Ethiopian wars. Due to its defeats in
the Horn of Africa, the Khedival army was weakened. Furthermore, Egypt’s already
considerable indebtedness increased. This meant that the Khedivate could not continue
expansionist projects while negotiations with foreign creditors became urgent. Hence, the
ultimate abolition of the slave trade with detailed plans and regulations that did not occur
before 1877 might result from the changed situation.
The Beylik of Tunis did not face the same circumstances. Although it attempted to
modernize its army, the size of the military was small. The Beylik also did not pursue
expansionism. In contrast, it only endeavored to ensure its survival between expanding
powers. Therefore, it did not require a constant flow of black slaves who would be
recruited into the military. Meanwhile, the procurement of slaves was incompatible with
diplomatic efforts to gain the goodwill of the British. Therefore, it can be said that the main
direction of anti-slavery policies in Tunisia was not affected by the state’s need for slaves
as it was in Egypt.
Thus, it seems that different state strategies and demand for slaves had decisive
effects on the evolution of anti-slavery measures in Egypt and Tunisia. However, previous
approaches to the motives of anti-slavery policies under Khedive Isma`il and Ahmad Bey
have not paid enough attention to this difference. This thesis will thus compare Egypt and
Tunisia while emphasizing the different strategies and projects of the Egyptian Khedivate
and the Tunisian Beylik in a period of change as an important factor that influenced the
final decisions of the rulers on anti-slavery. In doing so, the way that anti-slavery was
adopted and adjusted as a part of their reform projects may be presented. In chapter
three, the aforementioned aspects in the state policies of two polities will be addressed.
8

This research is based on an analysis and review of accessible primary and
secondary sources written in English and Arabic. A few French sources are also
consulted. The primary sources used in this paper include published travelogues,
memoirs, reports, history books, and several materials extracted from the British Foreign
Office records at the National Archives and the Egyptian National Archives (‘Abdin
Archives).
British archival records were extracted from Cambridge archival editions such as
Slave Trade into Arabia: 1820–1973 edited by A. L. P Burdett and digitized materials from
the National Archives' online collections while Egyptian archival records were consulted
through Ismaʿil kama tuṣawwiruhu al-wathaʾiq al-rasmiya edited by Jurj Jindi and Jak
Tajir and the appendices of al-Hukm al-Misri fi'l-Sudan 1820-1885 written by Muhammad
Fuʾad Shukri. The archival sources including letters, orders, and edicts were mainly used
to analyze the intentions and directions of the rulers but they also shed light on trade
volumes and social conditions.
It is a limitation of this thesis that Tunisian archival records could not be consulted
even though British archival records related to Tunisia were used. As for Tunisia, however,
the comprehensive chronicle named Ithạf ahl al-zaman bi-akhbar muluk Tunis wa-ʿahd
al-aman written by Ahmad Ibn Abi al-Diyaf (d. 1874) provides a detailed account of the
Beylik of Tunisia in the nineteenth century and also illustrates the circumstances
surrounding slavery and anti-slavery in the Beylik. It is an important source to examine
the intentions and policy directions of Ahmad as well as the internal and external reactions
to his anti-slavery policy.
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Chapter 1: Engagement in the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade: Egypt and Tunisia in
the Nineteenth Century
In this chapter, I will discuss the volume of the slave trade in the Khedivate of Egypt
and the Husaynid Beylik of Tunis. The volume of a specific trade can be associated with
the policies regarding that trade for several reasons. Not only can it generate meaningful
revenues, but that trade volume can be intertwined with the formation of interest groups
and the presence of particular demand. Slaves were one of the main commodities traded
between North Africa and the interior of Africa, and therefore any restriction on the slave
trade or slavery could not be simply implemented because of the aforementioned factors.
Hence, we need to examine the engagement levels of nineteenth century Egypt and
Tunisia in the trans-Saharan slave trade before discussing the related conditions. The
first section of this chapter will discuss the sources of slaves brought into nineteenth Egypt
and Tunisia while later sections will examine the volumes of the trans-Saharan slave trade
of each country in more detail.

Sources of Slaves Brought into Nineteenth Century Egypt and Tunisia across the
Sahara
In the nineteenth century, the majority of slaves in the Middle East and North Africa
came from the interior of Africa. Although white slaves from the Balkans or the Caucasus
have been an important part of the history of slavery in this region, the inflow of slaves
from such regions during the nineteenth century decreased dramatically. The Russian
occupation of Georgia and Circassia during the nineteenth century decisively influenced
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the reduction in the supply of white slaves from these areas and the continuous conflicts
between the Circassians and the Russian Empire also disrupted the trade with the
Caucasus, the main source of white slaves.13 According to the calculation of Toledano,
the number of Circassian slaves coming into the Ottoman Empire might have been 1,0002,000 a year during the nineteenth century, and the number of Circassian and Georgian
slaves sent to Egypt was quite small. 14 Therefore, even though the highest classes
including the monarchic families still procured white male slaves as retainers and white
female slaves as concubines, dwindling supplies of them led to the severe decline of the
white slave trade in the nineteenth century.
As supply decreased, demand from regional polities under nominal Ottoman
suzerainty dwindled as well. White mamluks had occupied significant positions in the
military and the government in both Egypt and Tunisia until the nineteenth century.
However, although they still held major positions in both states, the employment of nativeborn Egyptians and Tunisians constantly increased until they replaced the mamluks in
public office during the nineteenth century.
Even after Muhammad ʿAli killed over 450 high-ranking mamluks – the mainstays
of Egypt’s eighteenth-century military and political system – the remnants still could hold
positions as officers in the army or governors in provinces.15 However, their days were
numbered as native Egyptians gradually rose through the ranks of the military and the

13

Mowafi, Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempts, 8; Gabriel Baer, "Slavery in Nineteenth Century
Egypt," The Journal of African History 8, no. 3 (1967): 424.
14
Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East, 90.
15
Baer, "Slavery in Nineteenth Century Egypt," 417; Khaled Fahmy, “The Era of Muhammad ʿAli Pasha,
1805-1848,” in The Cambridge History of Egypt: Volume 2: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the
Twentieth Century, ed. M. W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 146.
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government. Muhammad ʿAli started to appoint members of the rural notability to public
bodies and ʿAbbas Hilmi I (r. 1848-1854) elevated a limited number of native Egyptians
to posts in the central government.16 Saʿid also promoted descendants of notables to the
rank of colonel in the military and made a few native Egyptians provincial governors.17 As
for Ismaʿil, he promoted Egyptians to cabinet positions, elevated rural notables to
provincial governorships, and created the consultative chamber staffed with local
notables.18 The native notables and a growing corps of technocrats took more positions
inside the administration and replaced Turkish officials as well as mamluks.19
The situation of the Husaynid Beylik of Tunis in the nineteenth century was not
much different. The bureaucracy was nearly totally staffed by native Tunisians and the
importance of their positions was made explicit. 20 The new curriculum of the military
school also made it easier to integrate some natives into the officer corps. 21 While the
highest offices were still held by Turks or mamluks, their number constantly decreased
and the recruitment of mamluks stopped completely.22 In both Egypt and Tunisia, the
number of white slaves serving the governments was small and gradually decreasing as
in other polities in the region.23
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Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, "The Egyptian Empire, 1805-1885," in The Cambridge History of Egypt:
Volume 2: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century, ed. M. W. Daly (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 192.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Beth Baron, "The Making of the Egyptian Nation," in Gendered Nations: Nationalism and Gender Order
in the Long Nineteenth Century, ed. Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann and Catherine Hall (Oxford: Berg, 2000),
140.
20
Brown, The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 46, 65.
21
Ibid., 295.
22
Ibid., 52, 75.
23
Ehud R. Toledano, "Late Ottoman Concepts of Slavery (1830s-1880s)," Poetics Today 14, no. 3
(1993): 495.
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The majority of slaves brought into Egypt and Tunisia during the nineteenth century
were from the interior Africa rather than the other sources of the Ottoman slave trade.
While they were generally used for domestic service, they were also in demand for various
other purposes. For example, some of them became eunuchs in the Ottoman or
Moroccan courts. They were also employed as soldiers or agricultural workers, and the
demand for slave soldiers will be examined in greater detail in the third chapter. According
to the British diplomat’s, John Bowring, 1840 report, there were 12,000 black and
Ethiopian female slaves in Cairo while the numbers of black male slaves, mamluks, and
white female slaves were 4,500, 2,000, and 3,000 respectively. 24 A French diplomat
named Félix Mengin also presented the same figures, except that the number of female
black and Ethiopian slaves was 20,000. 25 Even though these figures do not seem to
provide the exact numbers, it is explicit that the number of black slaves outnumbered that
of white slaves. As aforementioned, white slaves were part of highest echelon of society
and their prices were also the highest. Although the presence of a district administrator
who was originally an Ethiopian slave was reported in Egypt,26 most black slaves and
freed black slaves belonged to the lower social classes as they were laborers and ordinary
soldiers.
While there was constant demand for black slaves for multiple purposes, the
supply was not disrupted in the nineteenth century and various supply sources of black

24

John Bowring, "Report on Egypt and Candia," Parliamentary Papers 21 (1840), 9-10; Among 4,500
black male slaves he mentioned, 2,500 served in the army.
25
Félix Mengin, Histoire sommaire de l'Égypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed-Aly (Paris: Firmin
Didot Freres, 1839), 157, 159.
26
ʿAli Mubarak, al-Khitat al-tawfiqiya al-jadida li-Misr al-Qahira (Bulaq: al-Matbaʿa al-Kubra al-Amiriya,
1886–89), 9:39; Lorne M. Kenny, “ʿAlī Mubārak: Nineteenth Century Egyptian Educator and
Administrator,” Middle East Journal 21, no. 1 (1967): 36-37.
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slaves existed in Africa. Therefore, the volume of the trans-Saharan slave trade was
naturally high. Certainly, the major sources of black slaves differed for each polity. As
Gabriel Baer found, there were five main sources of black slaves in the case of nineteenth
century Egypt. The most important source was the south and west of Darfur due to the
quantity and reliability of supply. Ongoing wars between the Sultanate of Darfur and
neighboring tribes guaranteed a constant supply of slaves who were captured in these
wars.27 The slave raiding system was also well organized and many notables and slave
traders in Darfur participated in raids. Sennar was another major source of slaves and the
area along the White Nile between Darfur and Sennar also provided slaves who were
taken captive in tribal wars. Major tribes in this area including the Dinka and Nuer
frequently waged war against each other and the captives from the wars were mostly sold
to slave merchants.28 In addition to the aforementioned geographical areas, Bornu nearby
Lake Chad and Wadai in the eastern part of modern-day Chad also provided slaves to
Egypt through the Western Desert.29 The oases scattered between Libya and Egypt were
important stations on this route. The fifth and last source was the East African coast and
Ethiopia. The slaves from these regions were conveyed on vessels that sailed through
the Red Sea to the ports of Massawa or Zeila. 30 The 1848 census taken in Egypt also
revealed these sources by identifying members of trans-Saharan African groups living in
Egyptian cities and villages. A large portion of them were slaves or former slaves. Their
origins were recorded differently such as Bilad al-Sudan, Bilad al-Habasha, Bilad al-

27

Baer, "Slavery in Nineteenth Century Egypt," 424.
Douglas H. Johnson, "Tribal Boundaries and Border Wars: Nuer-Dinka Relations in the Sobat and
Zaraf Valleys, c.1860-1976," The Journal of African History 23, no. 2 (1982): 188. Johnson described the
way of wars and feuds between Dinka and Nuer from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth
century in this article.
29
Baer, "Slavery in Nineteenth Century Egypt," 425.
30
Ibid.
28
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Takrur, and Darfur. Bilad al-Sudan includes Sennar and the areas alongside the Nile or
the Nuba Mountains. Bilad al-Habasha indicates the areas south and west of the
Ethiopian highlands while Bilad al-Takrur signifies Western Africa including Chad and
Hausaland.31
As there were many sources of slaves located in diverse geographical areas in
Africa, various regional centers for the slave trade existed in Egypt. Asyut can be
mentioned as the most flourishing hub of the Sudan trade until the middle 19 th century
because the caravans from Darfur annually visited there.32 This city developed due to its
geographical position being suitable for engaging in transit trade between the Sudan and
Cairo, in addition to a vast plain for prosperous agriculture surrounding the city. Asyut had
grown since the early eighteenth century and it was a major city of Upper Egypt at the
turn of the century. A Coptic historian named Michail Sharubim (d. 1920) stated that a
local notable al-Wazir, who was temporarily entrusted to administer Upper Egypt after the
French army retreated from Egypt, was stationed in Asyut.33 It became the capital of
Upper Egypt in 1811 and ʿAli Mubarak (d. 1893), a famous minister of the Khedival
government, mentioned that there were approximately 20 wakālas (trade houses) in the
city.34 As Darfur was a major source of black slaves, the caravans from there carried

31

For the composition of trans-Saharan Africans living in Cairo and Egypt that appeared in the 1848
census and records of European visitors, see Terence Walz, “Sudanese, Habasha, Takarna, and
Barabira:Trans-Saharan Africans in Cairo as Shown in the 1848 Census,” in Race and Slavery in the
Middle East: Histories of Trans-Saharan Africans in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, Sudan, and the Ottoman
Mediterranean, ed. Terence Walz and Kenneth M. Cuno (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press,
2010), 43-76.
32
Mubarak, al-Khitat, 17:32.
33
Mikhaʾil Sharubim, al-Kafi fi tarikh Misr al-qadim wa al-hadith (Bulaq: al-Matbaʿa al-Kubra al-Amiriya,
1900), 4:15.
34
Terence Walz, “Family Archives in Egypt: New Light on Nineteenth-Century Provincial Trade,” in
L'Egypte au XIXe siècle, ed. Robert Mantran (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1982), 16; Mubarak, al-Khitat,
12:103.
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many slaves to Asyut. Although the merchants from Darfur tended to carry slaves to Cairo
instead of selling them in Asyut to get more profits, Asyut was an important station where
the majority of slaves from Darfur into Egypt passed.35 Asyut had maintained its active
trade until the early 1870s, when the conquest of Darfur ended trade along the darb alarbaʿīn which connected Darfur to Asyut through the desert and oases. 36 Despite its
importance, Asyut was not the only trading station carrying slaves into Egypt. For example,
the slaves from Bornu or Wadai entered Egypt through Siwa and the slaves sailing
through the Red Sea reached Suez to be transported into Egypt. 37 Daraw was also an
important transit point where the inhabitants were actively engaged in the slave trade,
one of the major means of living for them. 38 This town, along with Esna and Aswan, was
a major entrepôt for the slaves transported from Sennar or Shendi.39

Terence Walz, “Asyūṭ in the 1260's (1844-53),” Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt 15
(1978): 120.
36
Walz, “Family Archives in Egypt,” 33; Mubarak, al-Khitat, 17:32.
37
Mubarak, al-Khitat, 12:112; Mowafi, Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempts, 31.
38
Mubarak, al-Khitat, 11:2
39
Mowafi, Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempts, 31.
35
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Map 1: Main slave trade routes around Egypt in the nineteenth century
Source: Reda Mowafi, Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempts in Egypt and the
Sudan 1820 – 1882 (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1981), 139.

In Tunisia, the main sources of black slaves were Borno and Hausaland. While the
trade route from Borno to North Africa flourished during the late eigtheenth century and
the majority of slaves sold in Tunis came from there, the city of Kano located in Hausaland
became the main commercial center for North African trade around the 1830s because
of the political instability in Borno caused by the Fulani jihad and wars with Wadai and

17

Bagirmi.40 Timbuktu was another important source of slaves although its contribution to
the trans-Saharan trade was less than the Central Sudan share of the trade.41 Regardless
of source, commodities, including slaves, imported into Tunisia converged on Ghadames
on the borders of modern-day Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya. Ghadames was a significant
staging post, where caravans gathered and departed to various destinations in North
Africa, such as Tunis and Tripoli. The Ghadames merchants also operated major trade
routes starting from the important sources of slaves including Kano and Timbuktu. They
supplied most black slaves to the Beylik of Tunis.

40

Montana, The Abolition of Slavery in Ottoman Tunisia, 45, 65-66.
Paul E. Lovejoy, "Commercial Sectors in the Economy of the Nineteenth-Century Central Sudan: The
Trans-Saharan Trade and the Desert-Side Salt Trade," African Economic History, no. 13 (1984): 107.
41
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Map 2: Main slave trade routes across the Sahara in the nineteenth century
Source: Ismael M. Montana, The Abolition of Slavery in Ottoman Tunisia (Gainesville,
Florida: University Press of Florida, 2013), 43.

These facts show the important differences between nineteenth century Egypt and
Tunisia in the patterns of the slave trade. Egypt had more sources of black slaves than
Tunisa and different groups of merchants were involved in the slave trade, while the
importation of black slaves into Tunisia was almost exclusively handled by the Ghadames
merchants. As it can be seen below, these differences would result in the different
volumes of the slave trade.
19

The Slave Trade Volume of Nineteenth Century Egypt
Although it is not possible to make an exact estimate of the number of imported
slaves at a specific time, the average volume of the trade can be inferred based on several
estimates made by European observers of the trade. Certainly, estimated numbers of
imported slaves vary. Those observations were generally made by travelogues and
diplomatic reports. For example, a British traveler named William George Browne, who
accompanied the caravan travelling from Darfur to Egypt in 1796, stated that the number
of slaves imported by that caravan was 5,000, even though he mentioned that a caravan
from Darfur to Egypt transporting 1,000 slaves was considered large. 42 This estimate
corresponded with what Pierre-Simon Girard, a French mathematician who accompanied
Napoleon on the expedition to Egypt, mentioned in his work on his experiences in the
French Expedition to Egypt. He estimated that the number of slaves imported annually
from Darfur ranged between 5,000 and 6,000 while the number from Senner was not
more than 150. 43 A French traveler named Mercure Joseph Lapanouse, presented a
different figure. According to his estimate, the caravan departing from Darfur in 1800
carried 12,000 slaves, although he mentioned that this was exceptional.44 He also noted
that the number of slaves annually imported from Sennar ranged from 300 to 400. 45 Louis
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Frank, a French physician and traveler, did not agree with other estimates and stated that
the annual number of imported slaves was between 3,000 and 4,000. 46 He also
mentioned that when he arrived in Cairo in 1797, the number of imported slaves in that
year was just 1,200 because of the additional tax; in contrast, he indicated that in earlier
times each caravan had carried 1,000-1,500 slaves but the number then decreased to
600 or fewer.47 Although these sources presented different estimates, it can be supposed
that Darfur was more important than Sennar as a source of slaves and the annual number
of imported slaves was several thousand around the year 1800. Walz adopted Frank’s
estimate and concluded that an annual average of 3,000-4,000 slaves might come from
Black Africa to Egypt and the number of slaves sold in Cairo may have ranged from 1,000
to 3,000 at the end of the eighteenth century.48
Estimates varied during the nineteenth century. A Swiss traveler named Johann
Ludwig Burckhardt travelled in Shendi in 1814 and described this town as the principal
market for slave traders. He estimated that the number of slaves annually sold in Shendi
was approximately 5,000, of whom about 2,500 were carried by the merchants from
Suakin and 1,500 were transported by those from Egypt. 49 He also stated that Suakin
annually imported 2,000-3,000 slaves from Shendi and Sennar.50 According to his record,
Esna and Asyut in Egypt imported the same number, and the annual supply of slaves
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from the interior of Africa to Egypt and Arabia ranged from 15,000 to 20,000. 51 John
Bowring, during his stay in Egypt in 1837-1838, made various estimates regarding the
importation of slaves into the major centers for the slave trade in Egypt and the Sudan.
He estimated that the number of slaves imported into Egypt every year was between
10,000 and 12,000.52 He also stated that the caravans from Darfur and Sennar brought
thousands of black slaves to Asyut annually and a single caravan carried 2,820 slaves in
1827; he mentioned that the number of slaves carried by caravans to Asyut had increased
from 500 to 5,000.53 In addition to these estimates, he also remarked that from 10,000 to
12,000 slaves arrived in Kordofan every year.54
As for the middle nineteenth century, the records of the British Foreign Office
provide several estimates. For instance, one memorandum mentioned that the number
of slaves transported to Cairo annually during the late 1850s was between 3,000 and
4,000.55 During the 1860s, the estimated number was high. One letter stated that 10,000
slaves came through the desert to Egypt, while others traveled up the Nile. Another
correspondence reported that 10,000 to 15,000 slaves were brought up the Nile to Cairo
every year, while an equal or even greater number of slaves found their way to Suakin or
the Red Sea.56 The reason for the increase has been presented as the cotton boom and
the need for agricultural slaves. The number of slaves imported into Egypt every year
during the 1860s based on the aforementioned records must have ranged between
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25,000 and 35,000.57 By the early 1870s, observers were reporting that over 1,000 slaves
were being trafficked into Cairo every year, while the estimate for all Egypt was 10,000
per annum. 58 The major figures striving to implement the anti-slavery policies of the
Khedivate, Samuel White Baker and Charles George Gordon, recorded their estimates
of the amount of slaves exported from the Sudan, most of whom were transported to
Egypt or Arabia. Baker stated that at least 50,000 slaves were captured annually and sent
via the White Nile and the various routes overland by Darfur and Kordofan. 59 Gordon
mentioned that from 80,000 to 100,000 captured slaves died during the years 18751879,60 and this record indicates that the number of exported slaves was also high despite
mortality rates because the total amount of captives was so high. However, although
these observations can present a general trend of the slave trade, they have obvious
shortcomings. These observers, temporary visitors in most cases, were not in a position
to conduct empirical or mathematical analyses of their data and the data itself was based
on anecdotal evidences.61 Their sources of information have not been found in many
cases and not a noticeable number of the observers did not specify their evidences as
well.
Despite these points, the trend of imports of slaves sketched by these observations
made at different times can be compared to the census data which specified the slave
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population. The Khedival government took major censuses in 1848 and 1868 that offered
the accounts of the Egyptian population and household compositions broken down by
age, religion, ethnicity, free or slave status, and occupation.62 Certainly, it is difficult to
track the exact number of slaves based on the censuses. The households of the notables
which held many slaves and servants were merely asked to submit the number of males
and females, adults and minors, living in their houses instead of intrusive inquiries being
taken and black soldiers serving in the military were not included in the censuses. 63
However, it is possible to find how the composition of slaves as part of the Egyptian
population changed. While the slave population increased by around 1 percent from 1848
to 1868, it is noticeable that blacks (Sudanese) became the largest minority in 1868 and
accounted for 5% of the population of Cairo and Alexandria.64 As the majority of free
blacks were freed slaves and so were their descendants, it can be said that there was a
constant flow of black slaves into Egypt. In addition, the rural villages showed the surge
in slave ownership, especially those related to cotton cultivation. For example, the number
of slaves of four villages of Damas, Ikhtab, Sandub, and Zafar increased from 24 in 1848
to 378 in 1868 and in case of Damas located in prime cotton growing area, there were no
slaves in 1848, but in 1868 there were 182 slaves who accounted for 5.5 percent of the
population.65 The majority of the slaves appeared in the 1868 census were males. This
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change is matched with the European accounts of importation of black slaves mentioning
the surge in imports of black slaves during the 1860s.
The imported slaves were a part of the population growth in Egypt, especially in
the 1860s, but it is assumed by some scholars that the population growth until the 1850s
before the cotton boom resulted in lower demand for black slaves mainly used for
domestic work. In the 1848 census, the number of free servants appeared higher than
that of slaves and Ghislaine Alleaume and Philippe Fargues mentioned that the transition
from slavery to free labor was represented in the census. 66 Kenneth M. Cuno also
indicated that the number of imported slaves from Africa during the 1840s and 1850s was
low while the internal movement of labor was brisk and even the demand for agricultural
and household labor in the 1860s appeared to have been met first by internal migration,
and only secondarily by slavery.67 While it is more obvious that the development of a free
labor market in the late nineteenth century contributed to the disappearance of slavery, it
is somewhat uncertain whether a similar process happened in the middle nineteenth
century. Although it is true that the population of Egypt in 1848 reached around 4,500,000,
increasing from around 3,800,000 in 1800, the number of slaves as part of the population
had not been mentioned before 1848.68
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In any case, several thousand black slaves were imported into Egypt annually
during the nineteenth century and the total number of slaves captured in the Sudan was
certainly much higher. Even during the 1870s when the anti-slavery policy of Ismaʿil
gained momentum, the traffic of slaves in Egypt and the Sudan was brisk. However, these
high trade volumes did not seem to result in the high tax revenue. Bowring stated that the
average duty on slaves was 105 piasters and the abolition of the slave trade would bring
with it a negligible sacrifice, not exceeding 10,000 or 12,000 pounds per annum. 69 The
tax on slaves also did not continue long since Sa`id abolished customs on goods coming
from the Sudan to Egypt to facilitate commerce.70 Saʿid and Ismaʿil implemented policies
designed to restrict the slave trade, and therefore it is unlikely that the trade had any
pecuniary interest to the government.
Hence, although it is true that many slaves were imported into Egypt and a number
of slaves were exported from the Sudan, the volume of the trade itself hardly influenced
the policies of the Khedivate. However, the high volume of trade and number of supply
sources formed influential interest groups of slave traders, and the constant supply means
that there was a specific demand. These factors influenced the process of policy
implementation as I will show subsequently.

The Slave Trade Volume of Nineteenth Century Tunisia
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When it comes to the Husaynid Beylik of Tunis in the nineteenth century, not many
sources mentioned the number of slaves imported into Tunisia. There was no census
data and only a few European observers presented the figures for imported slaves. For
instance, Louis Frank stated that the annual number of imported slaves into Tunisia in the
early nineteenth century was from 1,000 to 1,200. 71 He also mentioned that three
caravans came per year and the slaves transported to Cairo on the same route crossing
the Sahara from West Africa were much less in number although many caravans came
to Cairo from different parts of Africa.72 Another observer also reported that about 1,000
out of a total of 1,300 slaves gathered in Ghadames reached Tunis. 73 Another estimate
was given by a British merchant named Thomas MacGill, who mentioned that three
caravans annually came from Ghadames to Tunisia and some of them brought 200
slaves.74 He did not reveal the total number of imported slaves per annum, but it can be
inferred that the caravan with 200 slaves was considered large according to his record
because he commented that the caravans were not reckoned rich and those bringing 200
slaves were exceptional cases.75 This remark contradicts the Frank’s statement, because
he mentioned that when the caravans brought 200 slaves they were considered
unimportant. 76 Therefore, it can be supposed that the number of imported slaves
fluctuated sharply and sometimes only several hundred slaves came to Tunisia.
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For the Ghadames merchants, Tunisia was not the only destination and there were
other important importers of slaves, especially Tripoli. However, it seems that their major
trading partner was Tunisia in many cases. As aforementioned, there was a report stating
that 1,000 out of 1,300 slaves in Ghadames were destined for Tunisia and M. Subtil also
stated that the major destination of the Ghadames caravans was Tunisia:
The Traffic in slaves was formerly one of the most important branches of
the commerce of Gadames. This city received a great part of those who
were brought by the caravans of Soudan, and kept there as a depot of
merchandise, which it distributed afterwards upon the different points of the
coast of Barbary, but principally Tunis, which itself exported 7,000 or 8,000
per annum for the markets of Smyrna and Constantinople.77
Although the amount of exports attributed to Tunis seems to be exaggerated, his
remark that the main destination of the Ghadames merchants was Tunis is worth noticing.
Even though Paul E. Lovejoy stated that Tripoli was the final destination for the routes
passing through Ghadames and the bulk of trade was exported through there while some
trade flowed to Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt, 78 it is not possible to estimate the exact
numbers of slaves transported from Ghadames to Tunis and Tripoli respectively.
According to his calculation, the annual number of imported slaves into Tripoli and Libya
from 1810 to 1830 ranged between 3,000 and 6,000. 79 He also suggested that the
estimate made by Ralph A. Austen, concluding that the Libyan imports of slaves from the
interior of Africa amounted to an average of 4,000 per year, referred to the number of
slaves imported into Tripoli exclusive of other terminals in Libya, such as Benghazi. 80
However, as Lovejoy himself stated, the sources of slaves from the interior of Africa to
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Tripoli were diverse and Ghadames was not the only transit point before arriving at North
African destinations. As for Tripoli, Murzuk and Ghat were also important transit points
for the slave trade while they have not been mentioned as a transit point to Tunis.
Therefore, it can be mentioned that Tunis took a significant portion of imported slaves
through Ghadames while the caravans from this town reached various termini in North
Africa.
It is difficult to say how much tax was levied on the slave trade in nineteenth century
Tunisia. The observers rarely mentioned the tariffs. Athough MacGill stated that the
people of the country paid eleven per cent on all the goods they imported, it is not clear if
the same tax was levied on the slaves imported through Ghadames. 81 One reference can
be found in the record of Ahmad Ibn Abi al-Diyaf. In his chronicle, he wrote that when
Ahmad Bey abolished the tax levied by the government on the sales of slaves, the amount
was more than 30,000 riyals per year.82 It is not clear if that amount included all the taxes
on sales including resale inside Tunis. In any case, the tax revenue from the slave trade
does not seem to have been high in nineteenth century Tunisia and this factor therefore
probably did not influence Ahmad Bey’s anti-slavery policy. Thus, he easily decided to
abolish the tax on sales of slaves.
It can therefore be said that the volume of the slave trade and the revenue derived
from it did not directly influence anti-slavery policies in nineteenth century Tunisia or Egypt
during the same period. However, the volume of the Tunisian slave trade was far smaller
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than that of Egypt and that difference seemed to influence other conditions. In Tunisia,
the Ghadames caravans were the only conspicuous transporter of slaves from the interior
of Africa. Although some slaves came from Tripoli to Tunis, the Ghadames merchants
still dominated the trade.83 Although they used many routes to procure black slaves, the
slaves transported into Tunisia were gathered in Ghadames in most cases. The traders
did not have their own military power and they had to pay customs to the Tuareg in
exchange for their protection. Therefore, their circumstances were different in many ways
from the traders based in the Sudan who controlled the slave trade in Egypt and the
Sudan. These differences will be discussed further in Chapter Two.

Conclusion
It is evident that the volume of the slave trade in Egypt was larger than that in
Tunisia during the nineteenth century. This difference was a corollary of the difference in
the trade networks. Many slave trade routes were used to reach Egypt and the traders
did not meet in a specific place before entering Egypt. They gathered in various
commercial centers located in the Sudan or the Horn of Africa. From those places, the
slaves they transported were brought into Egypt, a major destination. The Sudan was
especially important as a source of slaves and the Khedivate of Egypt extended its direct
influence over it in the second half of the nineteenth century, while other sources also
continually provided slaves to the territories of the Khedivate. Multiple sources of slaves
and slave trade routes assured this regular large supply. As for Tunisia, Ghadames was
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the only major terminus for imported slaves into Tunisia in most cases. Although the
traders from this town procured slaves from diverse places, they gathered in Ghadames
and the slaves imported into Tunisia were transported from there. Except for re-exported
slaves from Tripoli, hardly any slaves were observed arriving through other routes.
However, this difference in trade volumes did not directly influence the anti-slavery
policies of both polities. Both Sa'id Pasha and Aḥmad Bey abolished the tax on the slave
trade without hesitation and endeavors to restrict the slave trade were made in both Egypt
and Tunisia. Despite this fact, the difference in the trade volumes seemed to be
associated with other conditions that were closely related to different outcomes in the
process of abolition. Different groups of traders connected to the different trade networks
had dissimilar characteristics and influences. In addition, specific demands for slaves
could be met when the constant and enough supply was ensured. Those demands could
be an important factor influencing abolition.
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Chapter 2: Influence of Slave Traders and Their Organization in Nineteenth
Century Egypt and Tunisia
In this chapter, the influence of slave traders who supplied slaves to Egypt and
Tunisia during the nineteenth century and their characteristics will be discussed. The
slave traders who supplied slaves to various polities were important interest groups in the
region. They organized the trade networks and transported slaves along with other
commodities from the interior of Africa. Because slaves were a major source of revenue
for these traders, they would not meekly accept restrictions on the slave trade. They might
find other routes or markets and, if they had the power to resist the restrictions, they would
not be easily deterred by restrictive government policies. Therefore, the influence of
specific groups of traders was related to the success of anti-slavery measures in each
polity and the characteristics of these traders are worth discussing. In the first section, the
types of slave traders in the nineteenth century will be discussed. In the second section,
the slave traders in the Sudan, the main supplier of slaves to Egypt, will be examined
while the third section will concentrate on the Ghadames traders, the main supplier of
slaves to Tunisia.

Types of Traders
Different interest groups were involved in the slave trade, as mentioned in the
previous chapter. The slave traders who supplied slaves to the region during the
nineteenth century differed in their organization, but they may be roughly divided into two
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sorts. One is itinerant merchants engaging in long-distance trade and the other is armed
slavers.
The latter had their own armed forces, fortified bases, and in some cases territories
under their de facto control. They themselves procured slaves through raids or
interference with tribal feuds and transported their captives to the markets. Therefore,
they did not rely upon other groups to procure slaves and they could also defend their
interests by force of arms. The trade routes they used were diverse and some slave
merchants became influential figures controlling specific geographical areas.
The Arab and Swahili slave traders of East Africa are a good example of this sort
of slavers. During the nineteenth century, traders from the Swahili coast dominated the
slave trade in East Africa and their scope of activities extended to the Congo basin. They
raided villages or allied with local tribesman in plundering to procure slaves and their
bases for commerce and raids were entrenched. Tabora and Ujiji are examples of these
bases and the traders from the coast saw themselves as the political and social overlords
in the Manyema region.84 Tippu Tip, the most remarkable figure among these merchants,
dominated the African inland from the Tanganyika coast to the northeastern Congo,
controlled the slave and ivory trade in the region, and intervened in the internal affairs of
local kingdoms, such as the Kingdom of Kazembe. 85 In the late nineteenth century, the
Arab and Swahili traders united against the Congo Free State; although they were
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ultimately defeated, the Belgians could not quickly subdue them. These merchantwarlords could mobilize approximately 100,000 men, although their manpower could not
be concentrated.86
Slaves were not just a commodity for these merchants. They were also needed as
soldiers and porters. This type of slave traders needed to transport ivory, the main item
they sold along with slaves, to the coastal areas while an increasing traffic in slaves also
required larger numbers of retainers to manage transfers to the coast or Zanzibar. 87
These merchants also needed military capabilities to assure the regular supply of slaves
and ivory through raids and interventions in tribal affairs. They maintained the security of
the trade routes by using force as well. Therefore, slaves were necessary for their
business and any restriction on the slave trade ordered from a remote political authority
could not fully deter slave raiding. In addition, restrictions on the trade could not be
implemented when the slavers had their own military might and used various trade routes
to transport slaves through their networks. Hence, these traders were an impediment to
the fulfillment of restrictions on the slave trade. The slave traders in the Sudan from the
1850s who supplied slaves to neighboring areas and Egypt can also be categorized as
this sort of armed slavers.
The other group of slave traders engaged in long-distance trade without their own
military might and outposts were found along the trans-Saharan trade routes. In many
cases, they have not been specifically classified but lumped under the name of Saharan
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traders or caravans. Generally, the scale of their commercial operations was smaller than
that of armed slavers and they did not obtain slaves directly from the source. They also
lacked military power, although several armed men accompanied the caravans. Therefore,
they relied upon other groups in case protection was needed. The Tuareg, who were
closely associated with the trans-Saharan trade, exacted protection money from all
caravans coming to North Africa from Kano, an important point of departure for slaves. 88
In some cases, specific group of traders were centered in the major towns or transit
points located along the trade routes. They used those places as commercial hubs, but
constructed no outposts or fortified bases. Sokna merchants are one example of these
traders. Sokna was located in Fezzan and the Sokna merchants from there were the main
carriers of slaves between Fezzan and the Mediterranean coast.89 Tuati merchants based
in the Tuat oases can be mentioned as another example. They frequented the Ghat
market to buy slaves and transported them to Algeria and Morocco.90 They supplied some
of Algeria’s demand for black slaves and other Sudanese goods, and also a large part of
Morocco’s demand for slaves and other products. 91 The Ghadames merchants, the main
suppliers of black slaves to Tunisia, can be also classified as this type of traders. However,
their commercial networks were wider than that of the aforementioned traders.
In any case, this sort of trader could not effectively resist the restrictions imposed
upon the slave trade even when those imposing such restrictions were far away. They
had no military power to control their autonomous domains and they were centered in
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specific points along the trade routes that connected the sources of slaves to the major
destinations in North Africa. Therefore, when restrictions on the slave trade precluded
slave traders from conveying slaves through established trade routes, their only option
was to find new alternative routes. Hence, the differences between types of slave traders
were related to the success of abolitionism in each region. The suppression of the slave
trade in nineteenth century Egypt and Tunisia was also associated with the presence of
specific slave traders; this circumstance will be examined below.

Slave Suppliers to Nineteenth century Egypt and the Sudan
Arab traders moved along the caravan routes that connected the interior of Africa
to North Africa and the ports on the Red Sea Coast or East Africa to supply black slaves
and other commodities to the markets of Egypt and Arabia. The term jallāba was used to
indicate these traders.92 The word jallāba was a collective Arabic term for petty traders
and it seems that this term entered Egyptian usage in Mamluk times. 93 It became the
word used to indicate the merchants participating in the trade across the Sudan, whose
ethnic composition was diverse. Upper Egyptian jallāba joined by Syrians and North
Africans dominated the trade between Sennar and Egypt during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and the Sudanese jallāba increased their participation in the trade
during the eighteenth century. 94 According to Browne and Burckhardt, the Sudanese
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dealers from Dongola played a major role in commercial activities in the north-eastern
Sudan.95
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the slave trade across the Sudan was mainly
conducted by these jallāba. Different groups of jallāba managed the various trade routes
between major commercial centers. For instance, the jallāba who traded between Kobbei
and Kordofan were different from those who came to Shendi, and the Egyptian jallāba
who visited Shendi were different from those who went to Sennar. 96 Although some of
these merchants organized or financed trade caravans carrying slaves from remote
places, they did not directly procure slaves from the sources in most cases. As for Sennar,
dealers bought slaves captured by raids into the areas of the Nuba Mountains and
Ethiopia and transported them to Sennar.97
Other slave trade routes were also associated with multiple actors, especially in
case where large caravans were involved. The trade between Darfur and Egypt was
representative of this collaboration. The main source of slaves gathered in Darfur was
south and southwest of Darfur, an area called Dar Fartit, while relatively small numbers
of slaves were captured on the border with Wadai. While the Baqqara Arabs captured
slaves on their own and continuous wars with Wadai or neighboring tribes resulted in the
enslavement of captives, the bulk of slaves seems to have been procured by raiding
parties sponsored by the sultans of Darfur and these parties conducted the largest raids
covering wide geographical areas.98 Although the sultan himself hardly conducted any
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raids, he issued a permit named salaṭīya which was used to indicate licensed raids as
well.99 In principle, any of the sultan’s subjects could request permission to do a raid, but
a specific class of professional slave raider existed.100 After completing the salaṭīya, one
fifth of the captured slaves were taken by the sultan. 101 It seems that from 50 to 70
commissioned raids were conducted annually.102
Although the jallāba most often did not participate in those raids directly, they
generally advanced the credit required by the organizers of raids and some jallāba also
accompanied the expeditions to gain more slaves than if they chose to remain behind. 103
Other jallāba also bought slaves from local merchants or natives in Dar Fartit. Burckhardt
reported that some inhabitants sold their own children to the merchants to acquire
grains.104 The slaves exported to other regions from Darfur were procured by such raids
and purchases. The trade route starting from Darfur involved different groups of traders
(jallāba) and the settled traders in Darfur or Kordofan acted as middlemen between the
traders of the north and the sources of slaves located in the south.105 Although the riverine
jallāba seem to have opened direct communication between Egypt and Darfur, some
Darfur or Kordofan merchants also brought slaves to al-Ubayyid where other Kordofan
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merchants took them to Shendi and sold them to Egyptian traders.106 While the sultan
assumed ultimate control of the long-distance caravans, and dispatched his own caravan
to Cairo at times, the jallāba still played a key role in this long-distance trade and acted
as financers or organizers of caravans in many instances.107
The jallāba trading across the northern part of the Sudan and Egypt were similar
to the trans-Saharan traders who were involved in the trade between West Africa and
North Africa. First of all, neither of these groups captured slaves themselves. They were
also basically itinerant traders without self-sufficient bases although they frequented
major commercial centers and some of them were mainly concentrated in those centers.
In addition, they lacked their own military might in most cases and relied upon other
powers when they needed protection. For example, the Ababda tribesmen received
protection fees from the caravans going through the Nubian Desert and traders without
their protection were exposed to attacks from local tribes.108 They also usually had to pay
tolls to tribal chiefs when they passed through the territories controlled by these chiefs.
However, the main pattern of the slave trade across the Sudan changed after the
1850s. The change resulted from the opening up of the White Nile to merchants, assuring
free navigation and commerce and the development of the ivory trade. In 1839, Egypt
formally designated Khartoum as the capital of the Sudan, and many European and
Levantine merchants were attracted to this trading center. As steamers penetrated the
vast swamp named Sudd, sources of ivory along the White Nile became easily accessible.
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As early as 1844, the river was opened for navigation and commerce. 109 At first, ivory was
mainly collected by government expeditions and the governor of the Sudan dispatched
small annual trading enterprises to obtain ivory while the monopoly was sustained. 110
However, European traders appealed to their consuls to abolish the monopoly and
consular pressure resulted in freedom of navigation in 1852. Many European, Levantine,
Egyptian, and northern Sudanese Arab merchants rushed to the South to obtain ivory,
the most profitable item in the region. They were based in Khartoum and some of these
early traders, such as Alexandre Vaudey and John Petherick made their establishments
in Bahr al-Ghazal and Bahr al-Arab.111 Petherick also reported the development of the
ivory trade: according to his account, written in 1860, the quantity of ivory annually
transported down the White Nile to Europe had increased from 20 to 100 tons. 112
Because of this development, the ivory traders demanded more slaves. Ivory was
a heavy item to transport and therefore many porters were needed while traders wanted
to minimize transport costs. Using slaves as porters was ideal for this purpose because
they could be sold in Khartoum or coastal commercial towns after they conveyed ivory. 113
Slaves were also helpful in obtaining a large amount of ivory. In addition to hunting
elephants, the ivory traders had to raid hostile local tribes who had little or no experience
in trade to obtain ivory from them. They also had to secure cattle by force, to purchase
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ivory or commodities necessary for the traders and their retainers. In this process, the
traders also became to have many captives and those who enslaved were useful for their
business. In some cases, they were ransomed back to their people at the price of more
ivory tusks.114 They were also given to the armed retainers as wages. Certainly, some of
the slaves were recruited by the traders as well. Therefore, the captured slaves were
directly and indirectly useful for the traders to maintain their business and maximize profits.
While the ivory traders conducted raids to get cattle and slaves, they also built
zarības to effectively manage their business. The term zarība was used before these
traders constructed their fortified bases. For instance, the slave raiders of Darfur also built
zarības to keep the captured slaves. However, the zarības constructed by the slave
traders from Khartoum were multifunctional, and cooperative networks were also formed
between them. These zarības were fortified enclosures and used as temporary holding
camps, as entrepôts from which slave raids and ivory collection expeditions were
conducted, and as permanent or semi-permanent settlements.115 The number of zarības
increased as the slave trade became the biggest business in the region, replacing the
ivory trade.
From 1854, the ivory traders became involved in trading slaves because the supply
of ivory had decreased. Because of the high price ivory commanded, regular expeditions
to hunt elephants were organized and the number of elephants decreased as a result of
this trade. In addition, the natives’ stocks of elephant tusks were also depleted. As a result,
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the ivory traders could no longer meet the expenses of their expeditions and they had to
resort to trafficking in slaves to make up their losses. 116 After 1854, the ivory traders
became chiefly slave traders although they still collected ivory. They focused on capturing
slaves instead of elephants when ivory became rare. 117 Another important transition
happened in the early 1860s. European traders had withdrawn from the Sudan in this
period for several reasons. As the scale of the slave trade increased, all the European
traders in the Sudan were suspected of complicity in the traffic of slaves and they faced
serious accusations from the abolitionists while the scarcity of ivory became clear.118 The
competition between European and Sudanese merchants as well as the policies of
favoring local traders over foreign merchants also frustrated the European traders. Such
policies included the imposition of heavy duties on both exports and imports and the
establishment of checkpoints along the White Nile.119 While foreigners were vulnerable
to the caprices of the Khedival government, local traders found ways of evading high
taxes and did not rely on river transport.120 Therefore, the European traders left the region
and were replaced by northern Sudanese merchants.
While these changes happened, the zarība system also developed. During the
1850s, Alphonse de Malzac, a French ivory trader who constructed a zarība on the Bahr
al-Jabal in 1856, established the first set of rules for the internal administration of
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zarības.121 These rules designated the way of separating territories and routes managed
by each company and later commercial companies and traders adopted them. From 1853
to 1863, more than eighty zarības were constructed between the Biri and the Rohl.122 The
companies formed by the Khartoum traders managed these zarības and had exclusive
rights in certain regions. The specific geographical areas were controlled by the zarības
owned by each company and inhabitants near these zarības became dependent on the
zarības. Although some local chiefs allied with the traders and supplied them with
necessary staples in return for their goods or support in the power struggle with other
tribes, the traders exploited tribal warfare to obtain captives. As for the indigenous people
of the agricultural communities under the sphere of influence of zarības, they were
virtually in a state of vassalage. These settlements around zarības resulted from raids by
the controllers of these zarības. They raided the villages in the vicinity of their zarības and
captured the survivors, enlisting the fittest in their private armies and selling the rest as
slaves.123 Georg August Schweinfurth, the German botanist and explorer who visited the
Bahr al-Ghazal in 1869, wrote that the area between the Tondy and the Dyoor rivers was
devastated in three years and the once populous district with many huts had only a few
scattered habitations.124 Once violence subsided, the scattered locals started to settle
around the zarības and they cultivated and supplied the food and served as porters in the
expeditions of the traders.125 In this manner, the geographical areas controlled by the
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zarības expanded and the Bahr al-Ghazal was divided among six major trading houses
based in Khartoum and about half-a-dozen smaller trading groups associated with
them.126 Schweinfurth described the organization of zarības as below:
As the various associations were entering upon mutual competition, in order
to prevent disagreements, there was laid down a kind of Seriba [zarība] law,
which was pretty well the same everywhere. First of all, the territories
immediately dependent were distinctly designated. Then it provided that the
approaches to a meshera [landing port] should only be used by those who
could establish a claim to it. Nearly every Seriba has its separate avenues,
upon which it levies a toll, and an avenue without tolls is not a legitimate
highway at all. . . . Each separate company had its own route and its own
train of captains, who purchased the ivory and procured a market. No newcomers were allowed to intrude themselves into an established market, or
to infringe upon its trade. Fresh marts could only be established by pressing
farther onwards into the interior. These new establishments in their turn
were subject to monopoly, and were rigidly protected.127
The zarība-based merchants also absorbed the jallcba into their system. The
jallāba started to join the traders based in zarības and acted as their agents or partners.
In the Bahr al-Ghazal, where the influence of the zarība-based traders was clearest, many
jallāba eagerly adopted the new system. They could find protection and opportunities for
trade around the zarības and by the late 1860s, their association with the owners of the
zarības resulted in an extensive slave trade which supplied slaves to the markets of
Kordofan, Darfur, and Egypt.128 Local chiefs who had taxed the jallāba were also subdued.
For example, the Kredy chieftains who compelled the jallāba to pay the heavy imposts
were reduced by the Khartoumers to a subordinate position. 129 As these Khartoumers
penetrated into Dar Fartit, the jallāba in that region also cooperated with them, while the
sponsored raiders from Darfur were gradually expelled. Although the jallāba were
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reduced to middlemen under the zarība system, they were freed from paying tolls and
being subject to control by the indigenous communities.130 They were also freed from the
necessity of maintaining their few armed retainers while they could expand into the areas
newly opened up by the zarība-based merchants.131 As the zarības secured the routes
for expeditions and trade, the jallāba could also easily move to their final destinations.
Prominent zarība-based merchants such as al-Zubayr established and protected
overland routes through Kordofan. The jallāba transported slaves through these routes to
important commercial centers including Sennar and Khartoum.
Therefore, it can be said that the Khartoumers who completed the zarība system
and expanded their network could control the slave trade from capture to transportation.
As a corollary, some of these traders greatly expanded their influence and became
notorious in the Sudan. Examples of these merchants are ʿAli Abu ʿAmuri, Muhammad
Ahmad al-ʿAqqad, Mahjub al-Busaili (Biselli), Muhammad Abu Samad from Egypt or the
northern part of the Sudan, a Coptic merchant called Ghattas, and a Turk named Küçük
Ali. It was reported that Abu ʿAmuri, al-Busaili, and Küçük Ali were especially well known
in the Bahr al-Ghazal and they formed a triumvirate around 1862. 132 The geographer
Alvan S. Southworth, who visited the Sudan in 1871-2, wrote about the military power of
these merchants. According to his record, a single trader could employ as many as 5,000
soldiers; al-ʿAqqad had over this number on the White Nile while Küçük Ali and Ghaṭṭas
had 4,000 soldiers respectively and al-Busaili had 800 soldiers.133 As Schweinfurth stated,
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the number of soldiers stationed in zarības kept increasing.134 He also wrote about the
influence of the prominent slave merchants, such as Ghaṭṭas, in detail. For instance, he
mentioned as below:
The district between Ghattas’s six Seribas [zarības] in the northern Bongo
country and immediately under his authority, extends over an area of about
200 square miles, of which at least 45 miles are under cultivation. The total
population, to judge by the number of huts and by the bearers stationed in
different parts, can hardly amount to much less than 12,000. This domain,
worth millions of pounds were it situate in Europe, might, I believe, at any
time be bought from its owner for 20,000 dollars. 135
Samuel Baker, who strove to suppress the slave trade while serving as a pasha of
the Khedivate, also spoke of the influence of the slave traders he encountered. He spoke
mainly about his major opponent, al-ʿAqqad & Company, and its local agent in the Upper
Nile, Muhammad Abu Suʿud Bey al-ʿAqqad (Abu Suʿud).136 According to Baker, Abu
Suʿud managed 90,000 square miles in Central Africa through a contract from the
government.137 According to the same source, Abu Suʿud commanded 2,500 armed men
and his stations including Fatiko, Fabbo, Faloro, and Farragenia were crowded with
slaves.138 Al-ʿAqqad & Company and Abu Suʿud appeared to be involved in the internal
politics of the Kingdom of Bunyoro as well. Baker described their interference:
Kamrasi died about two years ago. His sons fought for the succession, and
each aspirant sought the aid of the traders. This civil strife exactly suited the
interests of the treacherous Khartoumers. The several companies of slavehunters scattered over the Madi, Shooli, and Unyoro countries represented
only one interest, that of their employers, Agād [Aqqad] & CO. . . .
. . . Each company, commanded by its independent vakeel [agent], arrived
in Unyoro, and supported the cause of each antagonistic pretender to the
134
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throne, and treacherously worked for the ruin of all, excepting him who
would be able to supply the largest amount of ivory and slaves. . . .
. . . The companies of Abou Saood [Abu Suʿud] supported all three,
receiving ivory and slaves from each as the hire of mercenary troops; . . .
and securing the throne to Kabba Réga.139
Baker also had to admit that the contracts between the slave traders and the
Khedival government limited his activities and he himself made an arrangement with Abu
Suʿud so that this merchant would supply him with provisions, porters, and even a
contingent from the 1,800 irregular troops under the command of Abu Suʿud.140 Baker
could not completely subdue them until his departure from the Sudan.
Although all of those aforementioned merchant-warlords were influential in the
Sudan, the most famous and influential slave merchant in the region was al-Zubayr
Rahma al-Mansur. He started his career as an employee of Abu ʿAmuri in 1856. He soon
became an independent merchant and gradually increased his power in the region.
During the 1860s, he became to control the main overland trade route passing through
Darfur and Kordofan. He also started to rule a wide territory in Bahr al-Ghazal and made
his main zarība named Daym al-Zubayr the capital of his realm. In 1866, he opened the
overland trade route between Bahr al-Ghazal and Kordofan by cooperating with the
Rizayqat Arabs. This route could replace the route on the Nile, which the Khedival
government monitored closely. In addition to his caravans, many travelers and merchants
from different places, even including Jedda, Massawa, and Tripoli, used this trade
route.141 In a single year, more than 2,000 jallāba reached Daym al-Zubayr.142 Al-Zubayr
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mentioned that his troops numbered 12,000 around the year 1869. 143 This number seems
to be reliable because he mobilized 7,000-8,000 soldiers in the expedition to Darfur.144
He regarded himself as a king and used the words ‘kingdom’ or ‘country’ to describe his
zone of influence.145 His influence reached its pinnacle during the early 1870s. Although
al-Zubayr defeated the expedition organized by the Khedival government in 1869, he was
officially recognized as the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal and Shaqqa in 1873 before he
participated in the conquest of Darfur.
Therefore, it is evident that the slave traders based in the Sudan in the midnineteenth century were influential in the region. Their presence seemed to hamper the
anti-slavery policies developed by the Khedival government. Saʿid introduced many
restrictive measures on the slave trade and slavery. He issued orders prohibiting the
importation of slaves into Egypt and the sale of slaves. He also declared that in case of
slaves being clandestinely introduced, they should be considered entitled to claim their
freedom, and be restored whenever possible to their family and friends. 146 He even stated
that all the slaves in Egypt who wanted to leave the service of their masters of their own
accord could get full freedom.147 However, these policies were unsuccessful. Despite his
decrees, the slave trade was brisk in the Sudan and the importation of slaves into Egypt
continued. Although the slave market of Khartoum was closed, a new market was opened
in Kaka and the slave traders found new overland routes. The official prohibition of the

143

al-Zubayr and H. C. Jackson, Black Ivory, 51.
Dunn, Khedive Ismail’s Army, 91; R. S O'Fahey, “The Conquest of Darfur, 1873-1882,” Sudan Notes
and Records, n.s., no. 1 (1997): 57; Shukri, The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan, 229.
145
al-Zubayr and H. C. Jackson, Black Ivory, 30, 49.
146
Bruce to Clarendon, Cairo, 17 January 1855, F.O. 84/974.
147
Shukri, The Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan, 111.
144

48

sale of slaves merely meant that slave sales were no longer recorded in official court
registers.148
The fundamental reason for this failure was the lack of control of the regions where
slaves were captured and/or gathered. If the slave merchants had remained itinerant petty
traders and depended on the riverine route, the restrictive measures by Saʿid might have
had some success. However, due to the geography of the Sudan and the changes in the
slave trade, it was not possible to prevent slave traders from importing slaves into the
territory of the Khedivate without solid control of the regions where the slave trade was
conducted. The zarība-based merchants increased their strength in the regions outside
Khedival control and absorbed the jallāba into their networks. As a result, they could
maintain the constant flow of slaves from sources in the interior of Africa to the
destinations in Egypt and the Sudan. The Khedival government during the era of Saʿid
could not monitor the overland routes used by the slavers; nor could it disturb their raids
and transportation of slaves. In addition, these influential slave traders easily bribed the
administrators appointed by the Khedival government in the Sudan. Saʿid himself also
contributed to the failure of his anti-slavery policies. He divided the Egyptian Sudan into
four independent provinces and this decentralized administration hampered the efficient
implementation of government policies. Moreover, he continually procured slaves to
recruit them into his guard or the troops stationed in the Sudan regardless of his antislavery policies. This circumstance will be discussed further in the next chapter. Therefore,
even though Saʿid seemed to act in good faith with respect to the abolition of slavery, 149
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his anti-slavery policies were not successful for several reasons and the presence of
influential slave traders who had de facto control of the main centers and routes of the
slave trade was especially decisive.
These slave traders remained influential in the era of Ismaʿil. As aforementioned,
the most influential slave trader in the Sudan, al-Zubayr, had his heyday during the early
1870s. One report even stated that Bahr al-Ghazal was in the hands of slave dealers until
1878.150 However, the Khedival government’s control of various regions in the Sudan was
gradually strengthened and the slave traders faced more pressure from the government.
Ismaʿil combined expansionism with anti-slavery policies and justified the expansion of
the Khedivate into the interior of Africa as a necessary step to terminate the slave trade.
He gave orders that the slave trade should end and imported slaves should be freed and
entitled to take government documents assuring their freedom. 151 He emphasized that
one of the most important tasks of the governor-general of the Sudan was suppressing
the slave trade. Ismaʿil also declared a monopoly on ivory and major goods from the
Sudan to weaken the zarība-based slave traders. 152 He formed a river patrol and
employed Europeans including Samuel Baker and Charles George Gordon as highranking officials in charge of suppressing the slave trade. These European officials
eagerly undertook their tasks and contributed to the expansion of the Egyptian Khedivate
in sub-Saharan Africa. Many Europeans supported the expansion of the Khedivate as an
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effective way to suppress the slave trade. As a directly involved participant in the
expansionist projects of Ismaʿil, Baker stated that the annexation of the Nile Basin would
be necessary to suppress the slave trade and protect the natives.153 The British consul
Sidney Saunders also stated before the accession of Ismaʿil that if the Khedive could be
induced to extend his rule to Gondokoro by annexing the White Nile to Egyptian territory,
an effective blow would be struck to the slave trade.154 By emphasizing his intention to
suppress slavery, Ismaʿil also could get diplomatic support from Britain in obtaining and
affirming privileges granted by the Ottoman court, such as financial autonomy and the
removal of restrictions on the size of Egypt’s army.
The combination of expansionism and anti-slavery measures not only drew
support from Europeans, but also resulted in the expansion of the Egyptian Khedivate
and the weakening of slave merchants. Although the slave traders maintained their
business until the khedive’s abdication, the geographical scope of their activities was
reduced and government control over the Sudan was strengthened. Some traders were
evacuated from Equatoria and the Upper Nile while others were punished or detained.
The Khedival government constrained even the most influential traders. Baker defeated
Abu Suʿud at Fatiko and drove all the slave traders out of the regions under his nominal
command. 155 Abu Suʿud was then arrested and a special tribunal composed of highranking officials from the Khedival government was formed to judge him. 156 Although
Gordon hired him after Baker’s departure, he was dismissed in 1874 and it was the end
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of his career.157 Al-Zubayr, the most successful slave trader in the Sudan, also could not
be free of the influence of the Khedival government. He came into conflict with the
governor-general of the Sudan and the Khedive in such issues as the administration of
Darfur and the poll tax. Therefore, he was compelled to visit Cairo to resolve the conflicts.
Instead, however, he was virtually detained in Cairo. Although his son Sulayman
continued to manage his realm, al-Zubayr’s absence was followed by a power vacuum.
Sulayman’s later rebellion also failed and the zarība system collapsed. Hence, it can be
said that the influential zarība-based traders including al-Zubayr could not ultimately
prevent the will of the Khedival government even though they could slow the process of
its anti-slavery and expansionist policies.
However, it should be also noted that Ismaʿil’s commitment to anti-slavery projects
was ambivalent. As aforementioned, he combined abolitionism with expansionist projects
and easily justified the expansion of the Khedivate by emphasizing the need for the
suppression of the slave trade. However, the actual implementation of the anti-slavery
projects seemed to concentrate on suppressing the traders, especially the influential
figures among them, rather than suppressing the trade itself. As the example of Abu
Suʿud showed, punishments of the traders were not properly applied. Other influential
traders such as Küçük Ali and Ghaṭtas were also released despite plans to jail and
bankrupt them. 158 This means that weakening the influence of the slave traders was
considered important while the imposition of punishments on these traders was
secondary. Before signing the 1877 convention, Ismaʿil did not specify the punishments
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to be meted out to the slave traders. In addition, although he implied that abolition was
necessary, he did not take any measure against slavery itself except encouraging the
governors to free slaves. His decrees against the slave trade just specified the general
principles against the slave trade such as strengthened monitoring of the rivers while
detailed steps were assigned to European officials Baker and Gordon. Although
government control of the regions in the Sudan was strengthened, the overland slave
trade routes passing through them were not monitored. Therefore, it can be said that
Ismaʿil’s anti-slavery policy could weaken the influence of the zarība-based merchants
but struck no decisive blow against slavery and the slave trade.
This might be partly due to his focus on expansionism rather than on anti-slavery.
However, another important factor seems to have been the constant demand for slaves.
T. Douglas Murray and Arthur Silva White stated that the measures taken by the
Khedivate and its officials including Baker did not strike at the root of the slave trade and
as long as there was a demand for slaves, there was bound to be a constant supply. 159
Although demand for slaves in Egypt varied, it seems that the demand for military slaves
by the rulers of Egypt, especially Ismaʿil, played a major role throughout the nineteenth
century. This factor will be the main subject of the third chapter.

Slave Suppliers to Nineteenth Century Tunisia
As for nineteenth century Tunisia, the suppliers of slaves were mainly gathered in
Ghadames. Although Grenville Temple, who visited Tunis in 1833, also mentioned Tripoli
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as a major entrepôt for the slaves brought into Tunisia,160 the number of slaves imported
via Tripoli was hardly mentioned while it has been reported that Ghadames supplied at
least several hundred slaves to Tunisia per annum. In addition, other observers only
mentioned Ghadames as a major entrepôt for the slaves brought into Tunisia in most
cases.161 Therefore, it can be stated that the majority of black slaves brought into Tunisia
came through Ghadames in the nineteenth century before the abolition of the slave trade.
As mentioned in the first chapter, most of the slaves procured by the Ghadames
merchants reached Tunis although some went to other destinations in North Africa. The
Ghadames merchants were the major slave traders of Tunisia in the nineteenth century
and other petty slave traders were not specifically noticed even though they may have
transported a small number of slaves into Tunisia. Hence, these Ghadames merchants
are the main subject in our discussion of slave suppliers to nineteenth century Tunisia.
The Ghadames merchants had an exceptional status in the trans-Saharan trade.
Ghadames was first mentioned in the Roman era and it became a major trading center
after the Islamization of North Africa. In Timbuktu, the Ghadames merchant community
was considered the most flourishing one in the city as early as 1591.162 It is evident that
the Ghadames merchants started to form their trading network long before the nineteenth
century and their diasporas could be found in various towns located along the trans-
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Saharan trade routes between the West African mainland and North Africa. In the
nineteenth century, they played an important role in the trans-Saharan trade. By using
their tribal relationships with the inhabitants of commercial towns, the Ghadames
merchants set up their own trading establishments and gained control over shorter routes
to the major West African commercial centers such as Hausaland and Timbuktu.163 Some
of these merchants married local women to secure their economic status while some
others even married into the families of the local rulers, such as those of Bornu and
Kano.164
The Ghadames merchants carried various commodities with the aid of their
networks and communities. In the north-bound trade, these merchants carried gum,
ostrich feathers, resin, gold dust, ivory and slaves. They also transported North African
merchandise such as sugar, paper, copper, beads, and textiles to the Sahel. The
Ghadames merchants used multiple routes to transport their goods and had a dominant
position on the Kano-Aïr-Ghadames route and the Timbuktu-Tuat-Ghadames route.165
They frequented Bornu, Ghat, various towns in Hausaland, and the harbor cities of Tunis
and Tripoli, where they led commercial activities. As mentioned, the Ghadames
merchants had a de facto monopoly on the lucrative trans-Saharan trade routes.166
The Ghadames merchants usually transported slaves from the south to Tunis and
Tripoli. As mentioned in the first chapter, these Ghadames merchants were the main
supplier of slaves to Tunis. The Ghadames merchants also organized the major caravans
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carrying West African goods to Tunisia, especially after the Constantine caravans ceased
their visit to Tunis. While various sorts of caravans visited other North African destinations
such as Tripoli and Morocco, the Ghadames merchants carried slaves and other West
African goods into the Beylik of Tunis mainly because of Ghadames’s geographical
vicinity to the territory of the Beylik. Therefore, it was natural that the Ghadames
merchants mainly used the Tunisian riyal as their currency.167
Although the Ghadames merchants had a major role in the trans-Saharan
commerce and formed a large trading network, they had limitations in their activities. First
of all, they were dependent upon other groups to protect their caravans and trade routes.
They had no military power except a small number of armed retainers. As a result, they
had to pay tolls to other groups to assure the safety of their journeys. For example, the
Tuareg levied heavy toll taxes on the Ghadames merchants in return for their exclusive
permission to these merchants to pass on the caravan routes under the protection of
them.168 The relationship with the Arab Bedouins of Shaamba was also important. They
levied tolls in return for ensuring safe passage of the Ghadames caravans nearby
Tunisia.169 The Ghadames merchants also depended on other groups to procure the main
items of their trade including slaves and ivory. For instance, the Tuareg acting as agents
for the kingdoms in the Sahel conducted raids to capture slaves and also sold slaves to
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caravan traders including the Ghadames merchants. 170 In any case, the Ghadames
merchants procured slaves in West African cities and they were not directly involved in
slave raids. As the Ghadames merchants had no military power or independent means
of securing goods, they could not open new trade routes although they could take a
dominant position in the existing routes. Therefore, when the main route to their
destination was interrupted, they hardly found new routes to that destination. Instead,
they headed to other destinations in most cases.
Their slave trade to Tunisia clearly reveals this group’s characteristics. In 1841,
Ahmad Bey abolished the slave trade. In the following years, he introduced additional
measures to implement the abolition effectively and slavery itself was also abolished in
1846. This change no doubt influenced the traffic of slaves through Ghadames. The
observers of the trade, such as M. Subtil and James Richardson, stated that the
prohibition of the slave trade in Tunisia severely damaged the slave trade conducted by
the Ghadames merchants.171 As aforementioned, the Ghadames merchants transported
slaves into Tunisia via Ghadames and the Tunisian Beylik could easily monitor this route.
The Ghadames merchants could not open an alternative route to the territory of the Beylik
and they diverted the traffic of slaves to other destinations such as Tripoli and Morocco. 172
It was also reported that the slave traders moved their business south to Ghat and the
Ghadames merchants also transported slaves from there to Tripoli. 173 The slave trade
conducted by the Ghadames merchants gradually declined in the following years.
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Ghadames was occupied by the Ottomans in 1843 and their heavy taxes and
encouragement of other merchants to compete with the Ghadames merchants disrupted
the trading activities through Ghadames, while the remaining slave traffic was also partly
diverted by small groups of freebooters.174
In addition, the Ottoman regime of Tripoli promulgated a new law to prohibit the
slave trade in 1856 and the British C.H Dickson reported in 1859 that the prohibition was
enforced regardless of opposition. 175 As a result, slave merchants could no longer
frequent Tripoli, a key emporium for the slaves transported by the Ghadames merchants
especially after the Beylik of Tunis prohibited the slave trade,176 as they had done before.
The Ghadames merchants chose to adapt to the new circumstances instead of
maintaining slaves as their main article of commerce. They contrived to compensate for
the collapse of the slave trade with the new booming business in ivory and ostrich feathers,
which were in demand in Europe, and they also sold imported goods including British
cotton cloth from Europe to Central Africa at a high profit.177 For example, the Ghadames
merchants established their new communities at Djadjidouna in Damergu to procure
ostrich feathers on a stable basis.178
After the Ghadames merchants diverted their slave trade away from Tunisia, the
slave trade only lasted in rural areas on a relatively small scale. As Ibn Abi al-Diyaf
reported, the residents of Djerba, the Bedouins, and the peasants opposed the abolition
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of slavery.179 However, the constant supply of hundreds of slaves was not reported after
the Ghadames merchants were prevented from transporting slaves into Tunisia. As
aforementioned, they did not have their own military power or territorial bases and
therefore they could not organize alternative trade routes on their own. In addition, the
territorial extent of the Beylik of Tunis was not large compared to the neighboring polities.
Hence, when the sole main route through Ghadames became unavailable in transporting
slaves, it was hard to find any alternative transit point connected to Tunisia. As a result,
the Ghadames merchants did not try to carry slaves into Tunisia after the abolition of the
slave trade and slavery. As mentioned above, they transported slaves to other
destinations or found new profitable merchandise.

Conclusion
As stated in the first section of this chapter, different groups of slave merchants
had different methods of trading. Although all of these traders were engaged in the longdistance slave trade, itinerant traders depended on other groups to protect their caravans
and trade routes while armed slavers could protect their trade by their own military power
and self-sufficient bases controlling nearby tribes. Therefore, while armed slavers could
have a considerable influence in local politics and resist external pressure, itinerant
merchants could not do the same. In addition, the armed slavers directly procured slaves
from the sources while the itinerant traders got slaves through other raiders or traders. R.
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S. O'Fahey named these sorts of armed slavers and itinerant traders as an East African
pattern and a West African pattern respectively. 180
As for the slave merchants who bore the slaves into the territory of the Egyptian
Khedivate, the majority of them were itinerant jallāba at first. However, as the ivory trade
became combined with the slave trade and fortified zarības were constructed from the
1850s, the transition to the East African pattern of armed slavers occurred. Both the
zarība-based merchants in the Sudan and the East African slave traders needed slaves
not only as merchandise, but as retainers. They also endeavored to procure as much
ivory as possible and expanded their influence to ensure commercial stability. The zarībabased merchants started to concentrate on the slave trade as the amount of ivory
decreased and their presence in the Sudan, especially in Bahr al-Ghazal, was a major
obstacle to the anti-slavery policy of the Khedivate. The zarība-based merchants
organized and protected their trade routes from the sources of slaves to the destinations
and they also could make alternative routes when the specific trade routes were restricted.
In addition, they autonomously controlled a vast territory by using their own military might
and therefore their activities were not severely disturbed unless the government control
of their territory was strengthened. As a result, the anti-slavery policy of Saʿid was not
effectively implemented because of their presence and Ismaʿil’s anti-slavery projects took
much time to weaken these slavers.
When it comes to the Ghadames merchants who were the main slave supplier to
the Beylik of Tunis, they followed the West African pattern in conducting the slave trade.
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Although they had a dominant position in the trans-Saharan trade routes between the
Sahel and North Africa, they relied upon other groups such as the Tuareg to ensure the
stable trade. Moreover, they had no autonomous base. Even though they were centered
in Ghadames, they did not have military might or territorial control of the town. As a
corollary, they could not effectively resist the external pressure. For instance, the
occupation of the city by the Ottomans and the heavy taxes imposed by them disturbed
the trading activities through Ghadames. It was also not difficult to prevent the Ghadames
traders from transporting slaves into the territory of the Tunisian Beylik. When the trade
route through Ghadames into Tunisia was restricted, the Ghadames merchants could not
make alternative routes because of the aforementioned conditions. In addition to the fact
that the slave market of Tunisia was small, the presence of slave suppliers without their
own power bases seemed to be related to the effective implement of the anti-slavery
policy of the Tunisian Beylik. Hence, it can be said that the existence of different types of
slave suppliers influenced diverging processes of implementing anti-slavery policies.
However, the pace of policy implementation seemed to be influenced more by
another factor, a specific and constant demand for slaves. As aforementioned, although
Ismaʿil eagerly tried to subdue the influential slavers and strengthen the control of the
regions in the Sudan, he did not introduce detailed measures to punish the slave
merchants and block the flow of slaves before he signed the 1877 convention. In addition,
as European observers indicated, constant demand for slaves from Egypt contributed to
the continuous trading activities of the slave merchants. As for the Beylik of Tunis,
although the characteristics of the Ghadames merchants made it easier to prevent them
from transporting slaves into Tunisia, the flow of slaves would have been maintained to
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some degree if there had been a specific and constant demand for a number of slaves.
In the next chapter, the decisive difference in the demand of military slaves between Egypt
and Tunisia during the nineteenth century will be discussed.
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Chapter 3: State Projects of Egypt and Tunisia in the Nineteenth Century and
Their Consequences for the Slave Trade and Slavery
In this chapter, I will discuss demand for slave soldiers in nineteenth century Egypt
and Tunisia and related strategies. Differences in demand levels were an important
reason for the differences in the success of anti-slavery measures in the two polities.
Egyptian and Tunisian societies during the nineteenth century both had requirements for
slaves, generally for domestic service. Slaves were also used in agricultural labor.
Agricultural slaves were used in the rural areas and oases in Tunisia, and could also be
found in various Egyptian villages and towns, especially in Upper Egypt during the
nineteenth century. During the 1860s, the cotton boom in Egypt considerably increased
demand for agricultural slaves; these slaves remained after the temporary boom ended
and demand was reduced.181 Therefore, in the nineteenth century Egypt and Tunisia had
similar demands for slaves but in different numbers.
However, only in Egypt were slaves required for military purposes. During the
nineteenth century, the Khedivate required regular supplies of slaves who were trained
as soldiers. They constituted an important part of its army and Ismaʿil was preoccupied
with ways of procuring slave soldiers. He recruited theses slaves into his army so that his
expansionist policy could be effectively implemented despite his open opposition to
slavery. In contrast, the Beylik of Tunis did not recruit black slaves while it tried to
modernize and reorganize the army. Other types of demand for slaves (domestic and
agricultural) were not directly derived from the government or the ruler, and therefore did
not seem to affect anti-slavery policies of the Egyptian and Tunisian governments
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although the population of these countries resisted restrictions on slavery and the slave
trade. Demand for slaves to serve in the military and related state projects will be
discussed in this chapter as a decisive factor influencing the difference between
nineteenth-century Egypt and Tunisia in the move towards abolition.

Khedival Military Projects and the Demand for Slave Soldiers
Black slaves began to be recruited into the Egyptian army from the early stages of
its formation. The main reason that Muhammad ʿAli invaded and incorporated the Sudan
was securing gold mines and black slaves who would be enlisted into the army. He
intended to form the new army consisted of the soldiers personally loyal to him and
therefore he intended to procure black slaves to recruit these soldiers. Initially, he did not
consider conscripting Egyptian peasants because that would have meant moving
productive labor from the agricultural sector and instead, he paid attention on the Sudan
to find obedient soldiers.182 According to Burckhardt, the Turkish officers enlisted black
slaves into their corps during the 1810s and bought from 600 to 800 slaves a year.183 He
also mentioned that Muhammad ʿAli had formed the plan of organizing a body of black
troops and of drilling the soldiers in the European manner, but opposition from his
principal officers frustrated the plan.184 However, Muhammad ʿAli actually put his plan
into operation, contrary to the observation of Burckhardt. In 1819, before starting the
conquest of the Sudan, he established a training camp in Farshut. In 1820, another camp

Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali Pasha, His Army and the Founding of Modern Egypt
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 86.
183
Burckhardt, Travels in Nubia, 341-42.
184
Ibid.
182

64

was established in Aswan and it would be known as the Military School of Aswan. In the
course of 1820-1821, captured black slaves were sent to Upper Egypt and 1,900 slaves
arrived at Aswan in August 1821.185 It was also reported that 6,000 slaves from Sennar
or Kordofan arrived at Aswan in 1822.186 The total number of black slaves transported
from Sennar and Kordofan was reportedly 30,000. 187 Although a large number of the
Sudanese slaves perished on the way to Egypt, the black slave soldiers formed the bulk
of the soldiery in the initial stage of Muhammad ʿAli’s military reform. 188 In 1823, six
regiments composed of black soldiers were formed. Each regiment consisted of four or
five battalions and a total regimental strength ranged between 3,000 and 4,000. 189 It was
stated that the first regiment was sent to Arabia and the second regiment was stationed
in Sennar while the other four regiments were dispatched to Greece. 190 As Muhammad
ʿAli’s military campaigns developed, he withdrew the majority of armed forces from the
Sudan, and therefore black slaves were continually recruited during the 1830s so that the
strength of the Sudanese units could be maintained and enhanced. It is hard to estimate
the number of conscripted slaves among the whole imported slaves. The census data did
not include the slaves serving in the military and the slaves specifically imported for
military purposes were not related to the ordinary imported slaves found in European
reports in most cases. In addition, many black slave soldiers were directly conscripted
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into the Sudan army and therefore their presence did not appear in the censuses or
reports only covering Egypt. Nevertheless, it was suggested that the surge in imports of
slaves happened during the 1830s because of the high demand of slave soldiers. 191
Black slaves were procured in different ways. Purchase was one method. For
instance, in 1822, Muhammad ʿAli ordered the governor of Girga to purchase all male
slaves capable of military service from a caravan carrying several thousand slaves. 192
Certainly, it was not possible to procure enough slave soldiers only by purchase.
Therefore, the government conducted frequent raids (ghazwa) on the borderlands of the
Sudan to capture black slaves. From several hundreds to 3,000 captives were taken in
each raid, but not all of them were considered fit for military service. 193 In addition to
purchase and raids, taxation was also a way of procuring black slaves. The tribes in the
Sudan, especially nomadic peoples, were required to pay their tax in slaves. The
Khartoum government ordered the chieftains or village shaykhs to provide adult male
slaves as part of the annual taxes.194
These black slave soldiers constituted an important part of the army. Although
Egyptian peasants eventually came to make up the main body of the army, the presence
of black soldiers recruited from slaves was still significant, especially in the Egyptian
Sudan. The garrisons stationed in the Sudan were mostly composed of black soldiers,
and they were also the main force behind expansion in Africa. 195 As will be discussed
below, the rulers conscripted black slaves into the army regardless of their public
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antipathy to slavery. Muhammad ʿAli himself also tried to stop the governmental slaveraiding in his later years, but the governors in the Sudan did not follow his orders.
Moreover, he admitted that blacks were taken by force in Sennar as soldiers. During a
meeting with Charles John Barnett, the British consul-general, he added that he had no
other means of recruiting the regiments which he was obliged to keep in that country.196
Therefore, it can be said that Muhammad ʿAli continuously needed slave soldiers and
thus connived to violate his own restrictive measures against slave-raiding.
The successors of Muhammad ʿAli also recruited slave soldiers for military purposes. In
the era of ʿAbbas Hilmi I, black soldiers were continuously recruited and used to maintain
the Egyptian government’s authority over the Sudanese population. 197 ʿUmar Tusun, a
Khedival prince and historian, reported in his book that the number of soldiers in the
Sudanese infantry regiment was 8,230 while the whole number of infantry soldiers was
69,748 in 1853. 198 The next viceroy, Saʿid, also continued to conscript black slaves,
although he took measures against slavery and the slave trade. As mentioned previously,
he gave orders to prohibit the sale of slaves and end the traffic. However, Saʿid himself
did not stop importing slaves, mainly for military purposes. Although he ended
government raids to capture slaves and forbade paying tax in slaves, he still recruited
black soldiers through slave dealers or tax-collecting chieftains and shaykhs. The size of
the Egyptian army was reduced during the era of Saʿid, but the garrisons in the Sudan
were relatively less disturbed. Although he decreased the number of military personnel to
less than 10,000 in the early 1860s, the Sudan garrisons were excluded from reduction
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and they maintained around 27,000 soldiers. 199 Therefore, black slaves were still
recruited into the Sudan army and some black soldiers were conscripted into the army
immediately after being freed by anti-slavery patrols. In this period, the governor of
Khartoum was ordered to form two brigades of Sudanese slaves. 200 In addition, Saʿid
formed his personal guards of black soldiers in the period 1859-1860. He employed
slavers to supply black slaves who would be drafted into his guard and a great demand
for slaves generated by Saʿid gave a new impetus to the capture of slaves. 201 In 1863,
Saʿid also dispatched black troops to Mexico at the request of Napoleon III, who
established Maximilian I as the emperor of Mexico. Therefore, Saʿid required black slaves
for multiple military purposes despite his anti-slavery measures.
This irony continued into the era of Ismaʿil. The difference was that he skillfully
used anti-slavery rhetoric to enforce his expansionist policy. Ismaʿil eagerly sought the
expansion of the Khedivate into Africa. From 1866 to 1873, Ismaʿil obtained firmans from
the Ottoman Sultan of the Empire that allowed him to reaffirm the autonomous status of
the Khedivate, increase the size of the army, and assert territorial rights over the coastal
areas on the Red Sea including Suakin and Massawa.

202

In addition to the

aforementioned ports, Zeila was also ceded to the Khedivate in 1875. Ismaʿil also
gradually increased the size of the army that was reduced by Saʿid. The number of
soldiers stationed in the territory of the Khedivate grew to approximately 90,000 in
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1873.203 They were equipped with Remington carbines, revolvers, and rifle-muskets, as
well as Krupp cannon.204 The strengthened Khedival army was mobilized for territorial
expansion and the maintenance of public order. During the 1870s, Egyptian authority was
imposed on the Red Sea littoral and in the Sudanese provinces. Darfur, Bogos, and Harar
were also conquered. A naval expedition against the Zanzibar Sultanate resulted in the
occupation of several Swahili ports, such as Brava and Kismayu, as well. The institutional
developments in the military and bureaucracy contributed to this expansion. Ismaʿil’s new
military schools produced many junior officers needed for military operations. 205 The
Khedival Geographical Society was also established to explore the interior of Africa and
promote the expansionist projects. Provincial administrative system staffed by provincial
and district governors was also applied to the annexed territories so that they could be
ruled by the Khedival laws. 206 Economic gains through taxation and exploitation of
resources in the annexed territories to maintain those institutions and alleviate foreign
debts was one of the motives of the expansionist plans in addition to dominance in the
Red Sea having geopolitical importance and manifestation of Egypt as a civilizer. 207
While Ismaʿil pursued expansionism in Africa, he pronounced that the civilizing
mission and anti-slavery were important reasons for expansion. He claimed that Egypt
led civilization on the African continent. 208 Therefore, the civilizing mission into Africa
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would bring order and progress in his view. 209 In this context, abolitionism was a main
part of the mission. When Ismaʿil appointed Samuel Baker as the governor-general of
Equatoria, he clearly stated that an expedition into the interior of Africa was intended to
subdue the countries situated to the south of Gondokoro, to suppress the slave-trade,
and to introduce commerce.210 As mentioned in the second chapter, the expansion of the
Khedivate could be justified in the eyes of Western abolitionists due to anti-slavery
measures. One British memorandum explicitly stated that the Khedivate of Egypt as a
civilized country made progress in suppressing slavery and the slave trade:
I believe that neither do our officials find any want of careful attention to their
representations on the part of the Egyptian Government officials, nor do the
latter complain of undue officiousness or causeless interference on our
part. . . .
. . . A proposal for making Egypt or any part of it free soil may appear to
many who have known Egypt well, even of late years, a very wild idea. I
confess it would, till lately, have so appeared to me, for I had not realized
the progress made by Egypt in most branches of Western civilization, the
growth of her real power in Africa, and the influence which I think she
deserves and will probably possess amongst the civilized nations. . . .
. . . An Egyptian expedition to the East Coast of Africa in connection with
His Highness’ efforts to extinguish the Slave Trade on the White Nile, can
hardly fail to be looked on by Her Majesty’s Government with approving
interest.211
As the cases of Baker and Gordon showed, Western officers were employed to assist the
expansionist project of Ismaʿil. While their military skills and performance were important,
it was also significant that their presence and missions in the Sudan helped bring
favorable responses from the West to the expansion of the Khedivate.
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However, expansion into Africa required troops and, as Charles Pomeroy Stone
stated, the Sudan had infinite sources for recruiting black slaves.212 They could be easily
and quickly supplied into the Sudanese provinces of the Khedivate from these sources.
Slave soldiers were also accustomed to the climate of the interior of Africa and were
reputed to be immune to the diseases endemic in the region. In addition, Egyptian troops
hated being stationed in the southern part of the Khedivate and they thought of this as a
punishment. Ismaʿil himself recognized these necessities and mentioned that Egyptian
soldiers were not fit to be deployed in distant regions in the Sudan. The recruitment of
Sudanese slave soldiers eliminated the enormous cost of sending those Egyptian soldiers
to the Sudan as well.213 As a result, the Khedival army stationed in the Sudan and the
Horn of Africa was mainly composed of black soldiers. Although Ismaʿil relocated some
Sudanese regiments to Egypt, the black troops still constituted the majority of the Sudan
army.
Although payment of taxes in slaves was officially abolished, tribal chieftains and
village shaykhs were occasionally required to supply a number of men for the army and
this sort of tax continued into the 1870s.214 Even in 1876, it was reported that the tax
collectors brought slaves for recruitment into the army. 215 Another method for recruitment
was confiscating slaves from arrested slave merchants and enlisting them into the army.
It was ordered that the physically fit male slaves confiscated from the slave traders would
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be enrolled into the army. 216 The officially manumitted slaves were also drafted into the
Khedival army in many cases. It was reported that when the manumitted slave knew
nobody who would maintain him, he was sent to military service. 217 When these sorts of
occasional enlistments could not secure enough soldiers, Ismaʿil employed slave
merchants to procure the slaves who would be recruited into the Khedival army. For
example, 1,500 slaves were obtained for 800-1,000 piasters each through slave dealers
in 1876, 218 although some of these slavers were the targets of the suppressive
expeditions against the slave trade when they traded for their own benefit.219 While Ismaʿil
recruited the slaves procured by these dealers into the Khedival army, he tried to avert
suspicions from Europeans by asserting that the enlisted Sudanese were regular
soldiers.220 In addition to the aforementioned ways of procuring black soldiers, one British
report showed that the regular army was still used to capture slaves even in 1876,
although this seemed to be an infrequent occurrence:
[T]he provinces that are being opened up are at the same time being
depopulated and devastated by slave trading and slave hunting. The
Khedive, it appears, offers from £7.10 to £8 for soldiers for his army in these
provinces. These soldiers are recruited by attacks made by his troops upon
peaceful tribes of negroes in which many lives are lost and the captives are
sent off chained or with ropes around their necks to Khartoum as
“volunteers” to recruit his army. 221
Therefore, it was evident that Ismaʿil used various ways to procure slave soldiers despite
his anti-slavery policy. As a result, the main body of the punitive forces against the slave
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merchants was ironically composed of slave soldiers. Even Gordon, who vigorously
endeavored to suppress the slave trade, admitted that it would be difficult to have a
sufficient force without recruiting black slaves: “The 25,000 black troops I have here are
either captured slaves or bought slaves. How are we to recruit if the slave-trade
ceases?”222
These black soldiers had an ambiguous status. There does not seem to have been
any form of comprehensive official manumission for these slave soldiers although several
instances of discharge or manumission were reported.223 However, it does not mean that
their status was equal to ordinary slaves personally belonging to individuals. Rather, they
were treated as free men having slave origins and their social status as soldiers was
considered more important than their vague legal status. As Ronald M. Lamothe stated,
a slave soldier’s condition as true slave was not permanent and manumission became
for him a matter of insignificance.224 What was really important for slave soldiers was the
presence of a patron. Regardless of their legal status, detribalized and uprooted soldiers
needed a patron so that they could remain in organized bodies. Many slave soldiers in
the Khedival army remained loyal to the Khedive as their patron when they could be
provided with necessities. Otherwise, they had to find a new patron and transfer their
allegiance. As a Sudanese veteran in the Khedival army, Ali Jifun narrated, these men
needed a master and they knew no other trade except being soldiers. 225 Therefore, it was
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natural that the Mahdist State could attract slave soldiers from the disbanded Sudanese
regiments of the Khedival army.
To sum up, the rulers of Egypt, from Muhammad ʿAli to Ismaʿil, regularly recruited
black soldiers through slavery. These black soldiers constituted the main body of the
Egyptian army stationed in the Sudan and therefore played an important role in
maintaining security there. They were also dispatched to the different battle fronts in
Africa while some of them were sent to overseas lands such as Mexico. These black
soldiers were important for the expansionist policy of Ismaʿil, and therefore he did not
stop recruiting black slaves despite espousing anti-slavery measures in public. While his
troops suppressed the influential slave merchants, the major part of these troops was
also comprised of slaves and he even employed several slave dealers. Therefore, it can
be said that the constant demand for military slaves generated by Ismaʿil’s expansionism
seemed to hamper the progress of the anti-slavery policy in the realm of the Egyptian
Khedivate. However, Ismaʿil finally signed the 1877 convention which set out detailed
measures against the slave trade and created effective outcomes in suppressing it.
Hence, although Ismaʿil showed a cooperative attitude to the British efforts to suppress
the slave trade, his final decision to sign the convention may have been related to the
changes in his policy and the reduced demand for military slaves. The next section will
concentrate on these changes.

The End of Expansionism, Changes in State Policy, and the 1877 Convention

74

Ismaʿil signed the Anglo-Egyptian Convention for the suppression of the slave
trade on 4 August 1877. This convention stipulated that the trade in black or Ethiopian
slaves would be forbidden within any part of the territory of the Khedivate of Egypt. Any
person engaged in the traffic would be severely punished and the slaves owned by slave
dealers would be freed. It was also stated that British cruisers in the Red Sea were
allowed to visit, search, and detain any Egyptian vessel found to be engaging in the
traffic.226 The Khedival decree on the same date also stipulated that the punishment of
slave traders would be imprisonment with hard labor for from five months to five years
while the sale of slaves from one family to another would be also prohibited in Egypt by
1884, and in the Sudan by 1889.227
It is certain that the convention did not stop the commerce in slaves. Although
Gordon, appointed by the Khedive as the governor-general of the Sudan, crushed the
slave traders, especially in Bahr al-Ghazal, and the obligations stipulated by the
convention were fulfilled to some degree, the success was partial and temporary in most
cases.228 However, the 1877 Convention set out a framework for later conventions and
the application of its clauses decreased the supply of black slaves. The public traffic in
black slaves was also disrupted. Therefore, it can be said that the demand for military
slaves decreased around the year 1877 and this change led to the application of the
convention. Although the Khedival government made a draft convention in 1873, it was
not decided when the convention would be concluded. In addition, as the first article of
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that draft showed, the target was the export of slaves from Egypt rather than the
importation of slaves into it.229 It was also reported that Nubar Pasha, the prime minister
of the Khedivate, showed a very evident preference for prohibiting the export, rather than
the import, of slaves.230 Therefore, Ismaʿil did not seem to be willing to agree on the
contents of the 1877 convention in the initial stage of negotiations. He remarked that time
was required for the total suppression of the slave trade.231 While this seemed to indicate
the difficulty of suppressing a well-organized business, it might also imply that the
Khedivate did not need to rush into signing a comprehensive anti-slavery convention.
Hence, there seem to have been decisive changes in Khedival policy that made Ismaʿil
decide to sign the convention in 1877 which stipulated more comprehensive restrictions
on the traffic of slaves than the 1873 draft.
Important factors that influenced Ismaʿil can be found in his policy changes. First
of all, his expansionist project was ruined in 1876. From 1875, the Khedival army
experienced failures in military operations in the Horn of Africa. In 1875, Werner
Munzinger, the governor-general of the eastern Sudan covering the Red Sea and the
Somali coast, was killed by the troops of Aussa. In the same year, the Ethiopian armed
forces severely defeated the Khedival military units commanded by Soren Adolph
Arendrup. Among 4,000 soldiers mobilized for this expedition, around 2,000 were killed
or captured in Gundet and the Ethiopian troops obtained weapons, ammunition, and cash
possessed by the Khedival Egyptian troops. 232 This defeat was followed by a more
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devastating failure as Ismaʿil sought to restore his pride. An expeditionary force
composed of 11,120 soldiers was dispatched from Massawa to the Ethiopian hinterland
in 1876 and the entire force that penetrated into the territory of Ethiopia was nearly
12,000.233 It was the largest mobilized force after the era of Muhammad ʿAli, but the result
was unsuccessful. Although the Khedival army did not experience a definite defeat in the
Battle of Gura compared to that of Gundet, the losses were considerable. More than 4,500
soldiers were killed or captured at Gura and the total losses of men in 1875-1876 were
estimated to be around 14,000.234 The Ethiopian forces also seized considerable military
supplies and valuables and the Khedival army’s morale received a severe blow. In this
situation, the expansionist policy Ismaʿil was pursuing could not be sustained. The size
of the army was reduced because of consecutive defeats in the Horn of Africa. In addition,
Egyptian officers started to show their discontent with the expansionist policy as they
thought that the defeats by the Ethiopians revealed the inefficiency of Turkish and
American officers.235 Even more significantly, these defeats dealt additional blows to the
already weakened financial condition of the Khedivate. Aggressive expeditions could not
be supported anymore and a new policy was needed to handle urgent financial matters.
During the 1870s, the finances of the Khedivate gradually deteriorated. Ismaʿil
needed funds to finance public works and expansionist projects, and therefore had to rely
on foreign loans. As a result, the entire bonded and floating debt reached £91,000,000 in
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1876, a major increase from around £3,300,000 in 1862.236 The failures in the Horn of
Africa aggravated the situation. Edwin de Leon stated that the expeditions to Central
Africa and Ethiopia were works of dubious necessity and of no immediate utility although
they cost £2,000,000.237 James Carlile McCoan also mentioned that the cost of the war
with Ethiopia was believed to be much more than £1,000,000 and it contributed to swelling
the overall debt.238 Therefore, Ismaʿil desperately needed material support in 1876 when
the bankruptcy of the Egyptian Khedivate was declared. He sought to satisfy the British
government in order to get support that would alleviate the pressure on him by his
creditors. Signing a comprehensive anti-slavery convention certainly suited this purpose
as the British government endeavored to conclude it with the Khedivate. Signing the
convention also helped garner support from European countries and strengthen the
position of the Egyptian Khedivate in the European financial markets. 239 Therefore, it was
natural for Ismaʿil to reveal his eagerness to make a specific treaty with the British
government regarding the suppression of the slave trade from 1876. 240
The conclusion of the convention had another merit as well. As the convention
allowed the British ships to search the ships suspected of carrying slaves in the Red Sea,
the territorial right of the Egyptian Khedivate in the Red Sea had to be clarified. As a
corollary, the British government recognized the right and jurisdiction of the Egyptian
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Khedivate in the waters of the Red Sea and the Somali coast as far as Ras Hafoun despite
Ottoman opposition.241 Hence, it can be said that the demise of Khedival expansionism
and financial difficulties made Ismaʿil focus on diplomatic means to break the crisis and
bolster territorial rights.
To sum up, when Ismaʿil could not maintain his expansionist policy due to the
weakened army and financial problems, he chose to concentrate on making political and
economic gains by satisfying the British government. Signing the anti-slavery convention
1877 might result from this circumstance. As the expansionist projects were ruined,
Ismaʿil did not need to procure many soldiers compared to the past decade. Therefore,
although the 1877 convention stipulated heavy restrictions on the public traffic of black
slaves, it did not seem to pose a big problem for him. In contrast, Ismaʿil could obtain
British recognition of his rights in the Red Sea and taking strong measures against the
slave merchants in accordance with the convention also helped strengthen control over
the southern parts of the Khedival Sudan. In addition, the procurement of black soldiers
was still possible through enlisting the liberated slaves taken from the slave traders. The
1877 convention itself allowed conscripting freedmen into the military if they so wished. 242
Of course, consent could be interpreted arbitrarily; Gordon also applied this clause to
recruit slaves rescued from traders throughout 1877-79. 243 In addition, the 1877
convention did not prohibit slavery itself. Therefore, although the public traffic of black
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slaves was disturbed, the Khedive could procure black slaves if he needed. It was actually
reported that Ismaʿil privately procured slaves after the conclusion of the 1877 convention.
He prevented any inconvenient diminution of the supply of slaves and authorized the
caravans carrying slaves destined for the palace.244 He just did not need to procure a
large number of soldiers for expansionist projects, and therefore disruptions to the trade
could be accepted because the supply of slaves was reduced but not eradicated. Hence,
it can be concluded that the reduced demand for slave soldiers due to the demise of
expansionism and the aggravated financial conditions of the Khedivate changed the
policy directions of Ismaʿil, and therefore the 1877 convention could be signed at that
moment.

State Policies for Reform, Survival of the Husaynid Beylik of Tunis, and its
Relations to Abolition
The military project of the Husaynid Beylik of Tunis in the nineteenth century was
different from that of the Egyptian Khedivate. Although military modernization was
promoted conscientiously in the reign of Ahmad Bey, expansionism was not adopted. He
focused on acquiring a self-reliant defense capability and the circumstances of the Beylik
were not suitable for expansion, as will be discussed below. When demand for soldiers
was not high, black slaves were not specifically required for the army. Along with the
relatively low supply of black slaves mentioned above, the low demand for military slaves
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seemed to be related to the anti-slavery movement in Tunisia, especially under the reign
of Ahmad Bey.
Certainly, Ahmad Bey’s predecessors had sought to implement reforms. In 1831,
Husayn Bey created a new niẓāmī army and drafted some native Tunisians into it. They
were stationed in Muhammadiya and trained by a French official to serve as artillery
units.245 Husayn’s successor, Mustafa Bey, planned to take a census to conscript the
native Tunisians, but he failed due to stiff popular resistance in the capital.246 Despite
such efforts, a comprehensive reform plan was introduced in the era of Ahmad Bey. He
established the Bardo military school and armament factories to manufacture small arms,
cannons, and shells. Many European military advisors were also employed to manage
these factories and train the niẓāmī troops. The new army was organized into seven
infantry regiments, two or four artillery regiments, and one cavalry regiment. 247 Although
conscription based on a comprehensive census was not attempted, native Arabs were
conscripted from various regions and the new army was almost exclusively made up of
them.248 They were stationed in major cities inside the Tunisian Beylik, but they were not
deployed for offensive operations. The only exception was the expedition to Crimea in
1854-55 to aid the Ottoman Empire against Russia.
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The main cause of military reforms as a part of the comprehensive reform project
in the era of Ahmad was his sense of crisis. The French army conquered the Deylik of
Algiers in 1830 and this defeat alarmed the Tunisian Beylik. In addition, the Ottoman
Empire established its direct control over Tripoli through military intervention in 1835. In
these circumstances, the reorganization of the army was deemed necessary as it was
evident that the old military system was helpless against outside invasions. However,
although Ahmad Bey intended to increase his military prowess and introduce an
independent military policy,249 his main efforts to maintain the sovereignty of the Tunisian
Beylik were directed at diplomacy. As a small country surrounded by expanding powers,
it was reasonable to depend on diplomatic abilities to maintain the balance of power.
While Ahmad tried to build good relationships with France and Britain, he carefully
avoided upsetting the Ottoman government. For instance, when France asked to modify
the boundary between Algerian and Tunisia, he replied that modification of the boundary
had to be approved by the Ottoman side.250 Al-Diyaf also reported that Ahmad refused to
ride a horse from Bardo Palace to Zitouna Mosque on the day of mawlid al-nabī by stating
that this would only be appropriate for the Ottoman sultan.251 In short, Ahmad intended to
maintain his autonomous position while recognizing the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire
and establishing good relationships with European powers.
Moreover, the Tunisian Beylik had no hinterland that might be incorporated into
the territory of the Beylik. As mentioned, France and the Ottoman Empire established
direct rule in Algeria and Tripolitania respectively. They surrounded the western and
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eastern borders of the Beylik and it could not challenge these expanding powers.
Although the southwestern border was not directly surrounded by French Algeria, there
was nothing but desert beyond the border. Even while the Beylik was engaged in wars
with neighboring regencies before the nineteenth century, no expeditions into the south
were reported.252
In this situation, expansionism could not be pursued, and therefore there was no
demand for black soldiers. As mentioned above, the Egyptian Khedivate needed black
soldiers to serve in the interior of Africa and subdue the tribes, merchant-warlords, and
polities in Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. As for the Tunisian Beylik, it had no such
reasons to recruit black soldiers. The only attempt to conscript black slaves in the Tunisian
Beylik during the nineteenth century was reported in the reign of Mustafa. His grand vizier
Shakir Sahib al-Ṭabiʿ suggested forming a battalion by recruiting 1,000 manumitted black
slaves.253 His suggestion was accepted but the recruitment method was not determined
and every black male in the capital was taken. Eventually, all these men were discharged
and the plan was cancelled.254 Although it is difficult to know why there was no similar
attempt after this failure, it may be supposed that there was no need to recruit black
soldiers as suggested above. The defensive forces of the Beylik could be composed of
natives while the number of blacks available to be recruited by the Beylik did not seem to
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be sufficient to form regular regiments, as it was revealed that even 1,000 blacks could
not be simply enlisted.
In addition, the procurement of black slaves was not compatible with the Ahmad’s
diplomatic strategy. He sought British support to maintain an autonomous position in the
region while the political conflicts around the Beylik deepened. When the French occupied
Constantine in 1837, tension between France and the Ottoman Empire escalated. While
this incident itself threatened the Beylik by implying potential military operations into its
territory, the Ottoman government, alarmed by the French offensive, also tried to
strengthen its influence on Tunisia. For example, the Sublime Porte intended to limit the
financial and diplomatic rights of the Beylik by several instructions sent in 1841 so that
Ottoman influence in Tunisia could be firmly established.255 Faced with the pressure from
both powers, Ahmad chose Britain as a potential supporter. Britain aimed to prevent a
French monopoly over the Mediterranean and maintain the status quo of the region, and
therefore the British might support the Beylik in maintaining its position as long as it
remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire.256 Hence, it was important for Ahmad to win the
good will of Britain and anti-slavery measures were the best way to achieve this due to
explicit British interest in the issue. Therefore, he directly revealed to Thomas Reade, the
British consul-general at Tunis, that he would endeavor to undermine the commerce in
slaves and stop slavery.257 As he expected, the British favored his anti-slavery measures
and declarations. One British report clearly mentioned that nothing could sway the British
nation in his favor as strongly as a continuance in the process of abolishing the slave
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trade and slavery within his Beylik.258 When the abolition of slavery was officially declared
in 1846, the British expressed their gratitude to the Bey for his achievement and European
newspapers praised his acts. 259 As al-Diyaf commented, the decrees against slavery
would satisfy anyone wishing for reforms built on freedom. 260
While Ahmad desired to emulate Europe by adopting abolitionism so that the
Tunisian Beylik could be considered as an equal partner, then, the urgent concern about
diplomatic support was decisive in driving his anti-slavery policy. Faced with Ottoman
attempts to strengthen its control over the Beylik, rapid progress in abolishing slavery also
might be related to Ahmad’s desire to show that his Beylik was moving at its own pace
along the path toward modernization.261 In any case, it seems highly likely that Ahmad
regarded his anti-slavery program as a special part of his reform projects.
To sum up, it can be stated that the Tunisian Beylik did not need to procure black
slaves for its projects. The new army was exclusively composed of natives and black
soldiers were not specifically required. Meanwhile, the procurement of slaves was
unhelpful to the diplomatic efforts of the Beylik. It was important to win the favor of Britain
to deal with the French and Ottoman threats and anti-slavery was a good way to do it in
view of the British eagerness in abolitionism.

Conclusion
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State policies and the related demand for slaves had an important influence on
anti-slavery programs in both the Khedivate of Egypt and the Beylik of Tunis during the
nineteenth century. Despite other factors mentioned in previous chapters, what the heads
of states considered as a priority in their state projects seemed to decisively influence the
procedure of their anti-slavery policies.
As for the Khedivate of Egypt, although Ismaʿil adopted abolitionism as a part of
his state policies and declared his opposition to the slave trade, his expansionist projects
required black slave soldiers. They had been an important part of the army since the era
of Muhammad ʿAli and Ismaʿil especially needed a number of black soldiers to maintain
the security of the Egyptian Sudan and continue his expansionist endeavors in various
parts of Africa. Therefore, he constantly procured slaves through diverse ways, even
including the payment of a tax in slaves, which was officially prohibited by his government.
Although he justified expansionism into the interior of Africa by asserting the need to
suppress the slave trade, he himself was a slaver, especially in the eyes of the European
public.262
This circumstance, however, changed around 1876 due to failed military
operations and high debt. Khedival forces dispatched to the Horn of Africa between 1875
and 1876 were defeated by the Ethiopian army. These defeats weakened the Khedival
army and limited its ability to mount offensive operations. In addition, the debt burden of
the Khedivate was aggravated. Its financial condition had already deteriorated during the
early 1870s, and the failures in the expansion projects exacerbated the situation. As a
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result, alleviating the financial crisis became a priority for Ismaʿil and his expansionism
could not be sustained. He started to concentrate on getting political and economic gains
through diplomatic approaches to European powers, especially Britain, and therefore it
became necessary for him to introduce comprehensive restrictions on the slave trade to
satisfy the British. The 1877 convention was signed by him in this situation and although
this convention disturbed the public traffic of slaves, it did not prohibit slavery and Ismaʿil
still could procure slaves through several existing ways. Moreover, the rights of the
Khedivate in the Red Sea could be recognized by the convention.
When it comes to the Beylik of Tunis, there was no policy change regarding antislavery during the era of Ahmad Bey. His main motive in opposing slavery was similar to
that of Ismaʿil because he also intended to gain the favor of the British so that the
autonomous position of the Beylik could be maintained when faced with the French and
Ottoman threats. However, the momentum of abolition was not related to situational
changes. As he did not pursue expansionism and his new army did not need slave
soldiers, he had no specific need for these slaves. As a consequence, he could promote
his anti-slavery policy at a rapid pace based on his will and need. Therefore, it can be
stated that the different state policies and needs of slaves seemed to decisively influence
the different paces and characteristics of the anti-slavery policies in the Egyptian
Khedivate and the Tunisian Beylik.
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Conclusions
During the nineteenth century, the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire
attempted to carry out various reforms and institutional changes to counter the expanding
influence of European powers in the region. This influence was highly related to the
contents of the reform programs, and abolition was an explicit example. European
countries, especially the British Empire, aimed to suppress the slave trade and slavery in
the region. During the nineteenth century, European powers were occupying various parts
of Africa and they wove anti-slavery, civilizing missions, and commercial interests into
their colonizing projects. Slavery was invoked as a symbol of the division between
civilization and barbarity; numerous acts of colonial expansion were at least partially
justified on anti-slavery grounds.263 It was even mentioned that all Africans who opposed
the European intrusion are slavers.264
It is certain that these European polities showed reluctance in implementing strict
anti-slavery policies after they made huge territorial gains in the late nineteenth century.
They intended to avoid confronting slave-owning elites and disturbing the social and
political status quo.265 For example, although slavery in French Algeria was abolished in
1848 and the slave traffic to Algerian territories was heavily disrupted, French
administrators did not enforce the full letter of the law because of their efforts to make
accommodation with local elites and avoid social unrest.266 Even inside Britain, the prime
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mover of abolitionism, it was suggested that the disappearance of the status of slavery
should be carried through with as little alteration as possible in the existing relationship
between master and slaves.267 While slave raiding and slave trading were determinedly
suppressed as they were seen as a menace to order and stability, a “slow death” for
internal slavery was deemed desirable.268 Despite this sort of double standard towards
slavery widely found in the late nineteenth century, European countries used anti-slavery
rhetoric to justify their intervention in African polities and the British Empire was especially
eager to spread its abolitionism throughout the nineteenth century. It exerted diplomatic
pressure on the local polities to adopt abolitionism and make strict restrictions on slavery.
In this circumstance, both the Khedivate of Egypt and the Beylik of Tunis took antislavery as a part of their state projects based on similar motives and circumstances. Both
of them intended to maintain their autonomous positions under the suzerainty of the
Ottoman Empire, and therefore they promoted various reform programs that would be
helpful in strengthening their capabilities to keep and extend their sovereign rights.
Khedive Ismaʿil of Egypt and Ahmad Bey of Tunis considered anti-slavery policies an
effective way to win the favor of the British and they sought political gains through
diplomatic relations with the British by adopting anti-slavery as one of their policies. In
addition, both of them also wanted to claim that their states were equal to their European
counterparts. In this context, their anti-slavery policies were used to present Egypt and
Tunisia as members of the ‘civilized’ world.
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However, despite these similar circumstances and motives, anti-slavery programs
followed different processes and paces. Although Ismaʿil publicly declared his desire to
suppress the traffic of slaves, he carried on procuring them. Moreover, the restrictions on
slave traders were insufficient to disturb their commercial activities before the ratification
of the 1877 convention although Ismaʿil employed Europeans to administer the Egyptian
Sudanese provinces so that the suppression of slave traders could be effective. As for
Ahmad, he took measures against slavery at a quite rapid pace. He abolished slavery
itself in 1846, five years after the abolition of the slave trade and the announced
restrictions were comprehensive.
This study concentrates on the factors that influenced the aforementioned
differences and presents three major different conditions between two states. In the first
chapter, the different slave trade volumes between two states are mentioned as one
related factor. Although the different volumes themselves did not seem to directly
influence the state policies of both polities, they were related to the different trade
networks and specific demand for slaves.
The number of slave trading entrepôts and slave trade routes associated with the
supply of slaves also influenced the trading patterns of slavers. Therefore, a monopolistic
group of merchants such as that of Ghadames did not appear in the Khedival Egyptian
territory where plural routes and bases were used to transport slaves. The characteristics
of the slave suppliers in the Egyptian Khedivate became more different from their
counterparts centered in Ghadames as the ivory trade was combined with the slave trade
in the Egyptian Sudan. The zarīiba-based merchants appeared and expanded their
influence and they could not be easily subdued. Thus, the suppression of the slave trade
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through Sudan was heavily restricted while the Ghadames merchants hardly influenced
the anti-slavery measures of the Tunisian Beylik.
However, a more decisive difference that directly influenced the political will of the
rulers seemed to be the presence of specific demands for slaves. Although Ismaʿil
ordered the suppression of the slave trade and intended to subdue the slave traders, he
needed a number of black slaves so that he could recruit enough soldiers required to
continue his expansionist projects in Africa. Thus, the military units deployed against the
slave traders were ironically mainly composed of slave soldiers. Ismaʿil also concentrated
on suppressing the slave merchants rather than suppressing the trade itself and
mentioned that the total abolition will take time. In this respect, his attitude resembled the
aforementioned European anti-slavery approach in the late nineteenth century. When
comprehensive anti-slavery measures were stipulated by the 1877 convention, his
expansionist ambition was already frustrated and a favorable relationship with Britain
became important to resolve the financial crisis. In other words, he became more
concerned with anti-slavery when he did not need a number of black soldiers and the
priority of the state was changed. Ahmad of the Tunisian Beylik did not need to procure
black soldiers as he did not pursue expansionism and the defense of the Beylik’s territorial
boundaries did not specifically demand them. He was concerned with staving off the
threats from France and the Ottoman Empire, and therefore he cared about a good
relationship with the British from the early period of his reign. Thus, he had a constant
motive for the anti-slavery policy while he had no specific demand of black slaves.
Therefore, despite the similar conditions shown by two states, the different
characteristics of the slave trades in two polities and the different policies and demands
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of the rulers led to differences in the implementation of anti-slavery policies. Similar
projects in the reform programs of nineteenth century polities in the region were thus
shaped by the different circumstances and needs. Even though abolitionism was adopted
partially because of external pressure, mainly from the British, the Egyptian Khedive and
the Tunisian Bey eagerly tried to find chances to maintain and strengthen the sovereignty
of their states through abolition.
Their anti-slavery measures also led to an internal discussion on slavery. In late
nineteenth century Egypt, many ʿulamaʾ opposed the abolition considering that the
attempts to abolish slavery would be overriding Qurʾanic law. 269 It was not uncommon
that the qadis refused to perform marriages of female slaves who had not been formally
freed by their masters regardless of the official certificates of their freedom. 270 However,
pro-abolition discourses also appeared from many reformist figures. For instance,
Muhammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) stated that shariʿa intended to abolish slavery gradually by
requiring Muslims to free as many slaves as they could and political authorities should
eradicate the practice of slavery under the name of the public interest. 271 Other reformist
scholars influenced by ʿAbduh, such as Rashid Rida (d. 1935), also agreed that Islam
provided a framework for gradual abolition of slavery. In Tunisia, an adoptive discourse
on anti-slavery also appeared so that the policy of the Beylik could be legitimated faced
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with some dissenting ʿulamaʾ who openly criticized emancipation.272 Muhammad Bayram
III (d. 1861), the Hanafi Grand Mufti of Tunis, issued a fatwa supporting the anti-slavery
edict of Ahmad Bey which stated that the abolition of slavery is imperative in consideration
of the public interest that can be damaged by runaway slaves seeking protection at foreign
consulates and the uncertain legal status of black slaves, many of whom were originally
free-born Muslims.273 A Tunisian official named Husayn Pasha also reiterated the same
logic that the abolition of slavery was necessary when too much harm was inflicted on
slaves and added that countries where full liberty is guaranteed are more prosperous than
others.274
In any case, the rulers’ steps were a starting point toward suppressing the
institution of slavery although the practice -- sanctioned by time and custom, and
supported by the social and economic causes -- survived much longer before social and
economic factors led to its disappearance.275
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